Markan Faith

Snyder, Daniel Howard; Rice, Rebekah L. H.; McKaughan, Daniel J.

doi:10.1007/s11153-016-9601-2

Cited by 35 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…While doxasticists insist that faith that p entails belief that p , non-doxasticists allow that some attitude other than belief that p can play the role that doxasticists assign to belief that p . Among the attitudes that some non-doxasticists allow are doxastic attitudes such us belief that p is likely, or belief that p is more likely than not, or belief that p is significantly more likely than each of p ’s credible contraries, etc., as well as non-doxastic attitudes such as propositional acceptance (Alston (1996), (2007) ), propositional trust (Audi (2011); McKaughan (2013), (2016), (2017) ), propositional reliance (Rath (2017) ), propositional hope (McKaughan (2013); Pojman (1986) ), imaginative assent (Schellenberg (2005), (2013) ), credence (Buchak (2012), (2017a), (2017b); Sliwa (forthcoming) ), and beliefless assuming (Golding (1990), Howard-Snyder (2013), (2016), (2017a), (2017b); Swinburne (1981/2005) ).…”

Section: Markan Propositional Faithmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For you to have faith that p , for some proposition p , is (a) for you to have a positive cognitive attitude towards p , (b) for you to have a positive conative orientation towards the truth of p , (c) for you to be disposed to live in light of that attitude and orientation, and (d) for you to be resilient in the face of challenges to living in that way. (Howard-Snyder (2017a), 57; cf. Howard-Snyder (2013), 370)Much needs comment.…”

Section: Markan Propositional Faithmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Towards that end, in what follows I will look at the details of my theory (Howard-Snyder (2013), (2016), (2017a), (2017b) ). After clarifying its central terms, I will distinguish two kinds of religious fictionalist – atheistic and agnostic – and argue that, even though no atheistic fictionalist can have faith on my theory, perhaps agnostic fictionalists can, as Malcolm insists.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends

Howard‐Snyder

2018

Rel. Stud.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends on how we disambiguate ‘fictionalists’ and on what faith is. I consider the matter in light of my own theory. After clarifying its central terms, I distinguish two fictionalists – atheistic and agnostic – and I argue that, even though no atheistic fictionalist can have faith on my theory, agnostic fictionalists arguably can. After rejecting Finlay Malcolm's reasons for thinking this is a problem, I use his paradigmatic agnostic fictionalist as a foil to explore a variety of ways in which to describe agnostic fictionalists, none of whom pose a problem for my theory.

show abstract

Section: Markan Propositional Faithmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Markan Propositional Faithmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends

Howard‐Snyder

2018

Rel. Stud.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Having noted that receptivity to the experience of God is an attitude in its own right, it is also worth re-emphasizing that receptivity to the experience of God is importantly like faith, since both are characterized by a high degree of resilience in the face of contrary inclinations, beliefs, and evidence. See Howard-Snyder (2017).…”

Section: Internal Religious Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Inaccessibility of Religion Problem

Cuneo¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Call agents who do not have religious faith or belief but find some religious ways of life highly attractive on broadly practical grounds "religious inquirers." These agents find themselves in a difficult position. On the one hand, there are epistemic norms that enjoin us to be conscientious in our believings. religious inquirers hold that conforming to these norms does not license having religious beliefs: there are simply too many evidential impediments to having such beliefs. On the other hand, there are norms that emanate from within the religious traditions themselves that speak against engaging in a religious way of life in order to enjoy its considerable goods by doing such things as playing the role of a believer or going through the ritualistic motions. instead, these norms seem to call for genuine faith. These two sets of norms generate the inaccessibility of religion problem (or the "inaccessibility problem," for short). The problem is that there are goods intrinsic to the theistic religious traditions that religious inquirers find both valuable and attractive but are accessible only by flouting norms of either epistemic or religious conduct. in this essay, i propose a solution to the inaccessibility problem. i maintain that there is an attitude-receptivity to the experience of God-that enables religious inquirers to enjoy a wide range of the goods internal to a religious tradition but without violating either external epistemic norms or internal religious ones.

show abstract

“…Does it require belief that the basic Christian story is true, or is it compatible with a sort of doubt that precludes such belief? Philosophers can contribute to answering these queries and thereby help us understand the nature of the religious commitment of a third of the human population (Rath, ; Howard‐Snyder, , ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%