Marginalized Vices, Virtue as Intermediary, and Ethical Generalizations: Recognizing the Particularity of Attaining Virtue

Abstract

Following the work of MacIntyre, I call for a particularized approach to ethics. I do not base my argument on concrete situations, but rather, on the way virtue works. Following Aristotle's account, I contend that most people's conception of virtue, even abstracted from particular situations, misses something key: the ways of attaining virtue can be vastly different, and even diametrically opposed, for different people. This difference exists even without differences in external factors. People struggling with divergent vices will need to practice virtue in divergent ways. Therefore, I contend that we need to particularize the way we view the attainment of virtue, not just because each person is in a different situation or context, but because not every person approaches virtue from the same vice. I. INTRODUCTION: WHY PARTICULARIZE ETHICS?In Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, MacIntyre advocates a particularized approach to ethics. He critiques vast generalizations often made in ethics, remarking that they overlook diverse cultural, personal, and circumstantial factors, which influence both what is ethical and how one might discover what is ethical. 1 He discusses various narratives of how a human being may flourish, adding, 'What I emphasized then were differences that result from the particularities of the different cultures in which those lives lived out.' He continues that the distinctive feature among different lives is the individuality of each agent's desires and practical reasoning. He says, 'For it is one of the characteristics of a good practical reasoner to be able to identify the relevant particularities of her or his situation, what it is on occasion about the situation that makes it difficult to apply generalizations and dangerous to rely on precedents.' 2 Ethics must be particular because what constitutes flourishing will vary widely from person to person.Similarly, Foucault observes that actions must be considered, not only in light of circumstances, but also in light of one's intentions and the end of the action. He prescribes reflection upon one's own actions and consideration of the ends relevant to those actions, offering the example, 'When we argue with someone it is in order to convey a truth to him. So if I find myself again in similar situations, I must recall these different ends so that from then on my actions will be adapted to them.' 3 Actions must be evaluated in light of their ends, as well as in light of their effect upon others in the proximity and additional circumstantial factors.Aristotle further validates particularity in ethics, because statements about more particular acts are truer than generalizations. While he recognizes the value of certain ethical V C 2018 Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered.