Many-Worlds: Why Is It Not the Consensus?

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the many-worlds theory, even if it is arguably the mathematically most straightforward realist reading of quantum formalism, even if it is arguably local and deterministic, is not universally regarded as the best realist quantum theory because it provides a type of explanation that is not universally accepted. Since people disagree about what desiderata a satisfactory physical theory should possess, they also disagree about which explanatory schema one should look for in a theory, and this leads different people to different options.

The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Current Status and Relation to Other Interpretations

“…My reading of Wallace [12] is that worlds are effectively autonomous branches, the mutual independence of which is ensured by decoherence: ... [the universe] must be understood as describing a multiplicity of approximately classical, approximately non-interacting regions which look very much like the 'classical world'. This is a widespread view; see, for example, the review of Allori [13] from which I took Wallace's last quotation. More than two decades ago, Wallace [14] wrote, Everettians [...] may legitimately and meaningfully use the terminology of many worlds without being required to represent these worlds in their formalism.…”