2011
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1865155
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Many-to-One Matching Markets with Externalities Among Firms

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Cited by 24 publications
(45 citation statements)
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“…To avoid combinatorial complexity in exhausting search, in this section, we propose a low complexity user scheduling algorithm based on matching theory [38], [39]. Given the user power allocation coefficients, the optimization problem (9) can be transformed into which can be formulated as a many to one bipartite matching problem with externalities among users [39]. Based on the concept of stable matching, we will develop a low complexity matching algorithm in the following.…”
Section: B Many-to-one Matching Algorithm For User Schedulingmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…To avoid combinatorial complexity in exhausting search, in this section, we propose a low complexity user scheduling algorithm based on matching theory [38], [39]. Given the user power allocation coefficients, the optimization problem (9) can be transformed into which can be formulated as a many to one bipartite matching problem with externalities among users [39]. Based on the concept of stable matching, we will develop a low complexity matching algorithm in the following.…”
Section: B Many-to-one Matching Algorithm For User Schedulingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is a many-to one matching problem. These types of problems have a long history in economics, such as the marriage problem (q m = 1) [38] and workers/firms problem [39] or hospitals/residents problem [40] with q m > 1.…”
Section: ) Preliminaries Of Matching Theory In User Scheduling: Basementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…From (7) and (9), we can see that the utilities depend on the current matching µ and consequently, the preferences of agents are interdependent. Therefore, the preferences of players are not solely based on individuals, but some externalities affect the preferences and matching as well [21]. Let Ψ(N , P) be the set of matchings.…”
Section: Small Cells' Preferencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many works have been presented in the literature to solve numerous matching markets in microeconomics such as [21]- [23]. Unlike previous works [21]- [26], the strategy of each player in the proposed matching game is affected by the decisions of its peers.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%