Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

Bando, Keisuke

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.008

Cited by 79 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…In fact, we can directly apply the approach of Sasaki and Toda [61,62] into this model. Bando [6,7] takes a different approach from Sasaki and Toda [61,62]. As we saw in Section 1.3, the choice function is a useful tool to analyze a classical model.…”

Section: Many-to-one Matching Markets With Externalities Among Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As we saw in Section 1.3, the choice function is a useful tool to analyze a classical model. Bando [6,7] extends the choice function approach into the market with externalities. We summarize the results of Bando [6,7].…”

Section: Many-to-one Matching Markets With Externalities Among Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We next define the stability concept provided by Bando [6]. As we saw in Section 2.1, when externalities exist, the stability of a matching depends on how a deviating pair expects the reaction of the other agents.…”

Section: And (Iii) For Eachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To rule out such incredible deviations, Bando [6] introduces the notion of strongly blocking and weak stability: A pair (f, C) ∈ F × 2 W strongly blocks a matching µ if it blocks µ, and Ch f (µ(f )∪C|µ(−f )\C) = C. A matching µ is weakly stable if it is not strongly blocked. The additional condition guarantees that the matching obtained from satisfying a blocking pair is persistent.…”

Section: And (Iii) For Eachmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Two-Sided Matching With Externalities: A Survey

Bando

Kawasaki

Muto

2016

JORSJ

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The literature on two-sided matching markets with externalities has grown over the past several years, as it is now one of the primary topics of research in two-sided matching theory. A matching market with externalities is different from the classical matching market in that agents not only care about who they are matched with, but also care about whom other agents are matched to. In this survey, we start with two-sided matching markets with externalities for the one-to-one case and then focus on the many-to-one case. For many-to-one matching problems, these externalities often are present in two ways. First, the agents on the "many" side may care about who their colleagues are, that is, who else is matched to the same "one." Second, the "one" side may care about how the others are matched.

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Section: Many-to-one Matching Markets With Externalities Among Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Many-to-one Matching Markets With Externalities Among Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: And (Iii) For Eachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: And (Iii) For Eachmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Two-Sided Matching With Externalities: A Survey

Bando

Kawasaki

Muto

2016

JORSJ

Self Cite

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“…The reason is that all involved BSs belong to one of the two sets, sellers and buyers. Matching is defined in [17] as: …”

Section: Matching Buyer Bss To Seller Bssmentioning

confidence: 99%

A matching-game-based energy trading for small cell networks with energy harvesting

Reyhanian

Maham

Shah-Mansouri

et al. 2015

2015 IEEE 26th Annual International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC)

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Abstract-Deploying small cells in cellular networks, as a technique for capacity and coverage enhancement, is an indispensable characteristic of future cellular networks. In this paper, a novel online decentralized algorithm for enabling energy trading in multitier cellular networks with selfish energy harvesting capable base stations (BSs) is proposed. A BS uses the non-renewable energy when it cannot harvest sufficient energy to serve its connected users. To minimize the non-renewable energy consumption, we establish a framework for trading energy such that BSs with energy deficit are stimulated to compensate their energy shortage with the extra harvested energy of other BSs. BSs with energy deficit are assigned to BSs with extra harvested energy by using matching theory. The extra harvested energy is distributed by the smart grid. Along with energy trades, BSs gain more profit and their utility functions enhance. Simulation results show that the waste of energy due to limited batteries and the non-renewable energy consumption decreases considerably when the proposed algorithm is applied.

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Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching

Chen

2019

Int J Game Theory

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This study investigates how externalities from downstream competition shape sorting in upstream labor markets. I model this as a two-stage game: A first stage of simultaneous one-to-one matching between firms and managers and a second stage of Cournot competition among matched pairs. If a firm's technology and human capital are strategic complements, it is rational for each firm-manager pair to expect that the remaining agents will form a positive assortative matching (PAM), and the PAM on the grand market is a stable matching under rational expectations. The PAM remains stable even when they are strategic substitutes but the substitutive effect is moderate. However, if the substitutive effect is sufficiently strong, a negative assortative matching is stable. Social welfare induced by stable matchings is discussed.This study investigates how downstream competitive externalities shape the sorting of matching in upstream labor markets. While I develop broad conditions under which the I would like to thank Benny Moldovanu, Andreas Kleiner, the associate editor, and an anonymous referee for their advice. I would also like to thank

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Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

Cited by 79 publications

References 17 publications

Two-Sided Matching With Externalities: A Survey

Two-Sided Matching With Externalities: A Survey

A matching-game-based energy trading for small cell networks with energy harvesting

Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching

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