Manipulability of majoritarian rules by coalitions with the same first-ranked alternative

Aleskerov, Fuad; Karabekyan, Daniel; Ivanov, Alexander; Yakuba, Vyacheslav

doi:10.1016/j.procs.2017.11.465

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We will not read the results for each rule in detail, but the paradoxes has consequence that there are many more negative theorems to be proved in the theory of voting that the positive ones. 4 . But at the same time it is a way of gaining the new knowledge about our theory and particular properties of voting procedures.…”

Section: Simpson's Rulementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such results cannot be ignored by anyone who interested in improving existing electoral systems.As it was said earlier, all voting rules are manipulated or dictatorial. But some procedures are more vulnerable to manipulations than others[Aleskerov, 2017[Aleskerov, , 2015. Some of the voting procedures requires more computational power than others, moreover calculating of winner in some voting procedures is NP-complete task as Dodgson's procedure[Bartdholdi 1989].There are more interesting properties and differences between voting rules, but our goal is to overview one of the most underestimated in scientific literature characteristics of voting rules -their vulnerability to different voting paradoxes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Vulnerability of Voting Paradoxes As a Criteria For Voting Procedure Selection

Gladyshev

2019

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Correct aggregation of individual preferences into collective one is central problem of nowadays Social Choice theory. After the Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorems it became clear that our desire to justify an electoral procedure is doomed to failure. At the same time a lot of scholars continued exploring different properties of existing voting rules and constructing the new ones. Contemporary research in this area explore two main properties of aggregation procedures their degree of manipulability and computational complexity of manipulation. Quantitative evaluations of these properties tend to be main criteria of voting procedure selection. But last decades it turned out that another threat for theory of voting is incompatibilities and unexpected outcomes of different kind, usually called paradoxes. This article provides complete systematization of voting paradoxes known for today. We also presented an attempt to formulate a complete proof of the (in)stability of seven most common used voting rules to paradoxes of any type, which had not been undertaken before. Our results show that different voting procedures are qualitatively different in the sense of vulnerability to voting paradoxes which makes reasonable to propose additional criteria of voting procedure selection and opens the gate for further quantitative research.

show abstract

Section: Simpson's Rulementioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Vulnerability of Voting Paradoxes As a Criteria For Voting Procedure Selection

Gladyshev

2019

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…, n}, decides which of m alternatives from the set X, |X|= m ≥ 3, to choose. 1 Each voter has a preference, i.e., a linear order 2 on X. We denote the set of all preferences by L(X).…”

Section: The Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In other words, a voter will manipulate if for every possible profile of her information set she gets at least the same result and for at least one profile she gets a more preferable alternative, on the condition that all others vote sincerely. 1 If at least one voter has an incentive to π-manipulate in P under F, then preference profile P is π-manipulable under F. A voter having an incentive to π-manipulate is called a π-manipulator. The set of all π-manipulators in profile P is denoted by Π(P).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%