Managing the 1986-87 Sino-Indian Sumdorong Chu Crisis

Pardesi, Manjeet S.

doi:10.1080/14736489.2019.1703364

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…There is little evidence that this inter-state political crisis meaningfully affected Indian attitudes toward China, even though it was considered quite serious at the time and was talked about as a potential flashpoint for war (Pardesi, 2019). The best explanation is quite straightforward: while the Sumdorong Chu crisis lasted some months and required high-level political negotiations to settle-India's foreign minister visited China later in 1987, one could argue that it flew below the radar of even a pretty prudent public.…”

Section: The 1986-87 Border Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Indian Public Opinion Toward China: Evidence from Seven Decades of Survey Data

Milliff¹,

Staniland²

2021

Preprint

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India is the world’s largest democracy and is growing steadily more important in the international system, yet we know very little about how India’s public thinks about international issues. This has become even more important as India-China relations have declined dramatically in recent years. This paper explores public opinion toward China by leveraging both historical survey data since the 1960s, and modern, scientific surveys from the 2000s onward. This is a unique compilation of survey evidence that allows for the study of both trends and rigorous individual-level analyses. We put it into dialogue with general disciplinary questions about the dynamics of public opinion toward foreign policy, focusing on China. Two main findings emerge. First, aggregate trends in views of China broadly track the general political situation between the two countries. We do not see clear evidence one way or another of whether the public is simply following leaders: in the 1960s, there is circumstantial evidence of elite-led opinion, but in the last decade, elite efforts to maintain a cordial relationship with China coexisted with increasingly hostile public sentiment. Second, we delve within these aggregate trends find systematic sub-national variation in attitudes. Foreign policy attitudes have fairly stable regional differences, and poorer and less educated respondents are systematically more likely to not respond when asked about foreign policy and world affairs. While there are aggregate trends that track broader geopolitical tides, there remains important heterogeneity within Indian opinion that requires further analysis. We conclude with implications for research and policy.

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Section: The 1986-87 Border Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Indian Public Opinion Toward China: Evidence from Seven Decades of Survey Data

Milliff¹,

Staniland²

2021

Preprint

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“…Several geopolitical and military factors led to de-escalation of the crisis, including India’s demonstration of its strength and resolve to defend the status quo on the disputed border. When both sides withdrew their troops, it ended the possibility of an immediate conflict (Pardesi, 2019).…”

Section: Doklam Stand-offmentioning

confidence: 99%

India’s Relations with China from the Doklam Crisis to the Galwan Tragedy

Kaura

2020

India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs

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No other bilateral relationship for India is as complex and challenging as the one with China. The intractable border dispute is at the root of their rivalry. The military stand-off at Doklam in 2017 had poisoned the bilateral relationship until steps were taken to remove mistrust and misunderstanding through two ‘informal’ summits between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping in 2018 and 2019. Nonetheless, the sense of general improvement in Sino-Indian ties generated at Wuhan and Mamallapuram was shattered by China’s aggressive behaviour in June 2020 at the Galwan Valley in Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The article traces key events during the Doklam stand-off and the violent military clashes at Galwan, as well as the steps taken by India to enhance political trust at the highest level. It contends that since there has been no change in China’s policies on a range of issues that are critical for India, it is not possible for India to remain ambivalent on how to deal with China. The article concludes that there seems to be greater recognition of the challenge from China and the need to recalibrate the Indian response.

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“…158 Mao also told Yang Chengwu that a new institution was to be established with the responsibility of rehabilitating the wrongfully purged old cadre. 159 At the same time, Mao sought to reduce radical influence in Chinese politics and foreign policy. Mao and Zhou Enlai were reluctant to go straight against Lin and top-tier radicals.…”

Section: Mao's Political Comebackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…158 Quan, 微行--杨成武在 1967 (Yang Chengwu in 1967), 123-24. 159 Ibid., 225. about the chaos in the Foreign Ministry and the 7 August Wang Li's speech. 160 Wang Li encouraged rebels to take over the task of personnel appointments and to take down Chen Yi.…”

Section: Mao's Political Comebackmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Wars, fought and unfought : China and the Sino-Indian border dispute

Balazs¹

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Managing the 1986-87 Sino-Indian Sumdorong Chu Crisis

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Understanding Indian Public Opinion Toward China: Evidence from Seven Decades of Survey Data

Understanding Indian Public Opinion Toward China: Evidence from Seven Decades of Survey Data

India’s Relations with China from the Doklam Crisis to the Galwan Tragedy

Wars, fought and unfought : China and the Sino-Indian border dispute

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