Managing Money and Discord in the UN

Abstract

How do international organizations in the United Nations system put together their budgets? What is the role of complex principals—most notably member states—and the complex agents in the bureaucracies of international organizations in budgeting processes? And what does a focus on budgeting tell us about the changing nature of the system of international organizations? This book provides answers to these questions through a detailed examination of budgeting in the UN system. The analysis draws on both quantitative and qualitative observations for a total of twenty-two UN system organizations and detailed case studies for the United Nations, ILO, UNESCO, and WHO. The findings demonstrate the importance of three key organizational outcomes—proceduralization, routinization, and budgetary segmentation—as international organizations grapple with managing discord over priorities as a result of complex principal–agent constellations. Contrary to a common view of international bureaucracies as pathological organizations, core budget routines are mostly successfully maintained. However, principal constellations are becoming more complex, notably through the rise of voluntary contributions and non-state donors; budgetary segmentation advances (in some cases even leading to the setting up of new international organizations); and budgeting and resource mobilization have become ever more intertwined. As a consequence, the capacity of international bureaucracies to fulfill their budgeting responsibilities is stretched to the limit and beyond.

Explaining the political use of evaluation in international organizations

“…At the same time, our results disfavour the state-centric view of international institutions which is embedded in rational design theory (Abbott and Snidal 1998;Koremenos et al 2001). As our findings from cluster 2 and 3 demonstrate, IO bureaucracies are able to use IOs' internal structure (evaluation system) to exert their influence using evaluation as a political tool (Patz and Goetz 2019;Knill et al 2019;Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009;Bauer et al 2017;Johnson and Urpelainen 2014). The key theoretical puzzle for future research is to explain the reasons for such variation in control over evaluation resources.…”

“…Fourth, evaluation may also serve the exact opposite purpose-for the IPA to exercise bureaucratic influence if it wants to do less or differently than asked by the member states (Elsig 2011;Vaubel et al 2007). A number of studies show that IPAs are highly innovative and entrepreneurial in employing various administrative tools and tactics to increase own autonomy and influence policy-making (Patz and Goetz 2019;Knill et al 2019;Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009;Bauer et al 2017;Johnson and Urpelainen 2014). Consequently, evaluation might be a tool for IPAs to justify such initiatives.…”

“…Evaluation can help states in intergovernmental bargaining and in exercising agency control. On the other hand, a growing literature emphasizes that IO secretariats (International Public Administrations-IPAs) act as independent actors in international policy processes (Bauer et al 2017;Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009;Eckhard and Ege 2016;Patz and Goetz 2019;Knill et al 2019;Johnson and Urpelainen 2014). 2 Evaluation can be politically useful for IPAs, to justify past and future action, or to steer the organization internally.…”

All hands on deck: levels of dependence between the EU and other international organizations in peacebuilding

“…They will try to prevent that IOs obtain resources through alternative channels thereby increasing their autonomy in relationship to the membership. Indeed, IOs normally get their resources from their membership with clear strings attached (Patz and Goetz 2019). In other words, IOs seeking outside resources for the fulfilment of their own mandates is generally considered a second-best option.…”

“…While some scholars have used resource dependency theory to explain the relations between IOs (Harsch 2015;Biermann and Harsch 2017), the extent to which the EU seeks partnership with other IOs remains puzzling. After all, the EU and other IOs are normally dependent for their resources on their members rather than on other organizations (Patz and Goetz 2019). In addition, if the EU gets resources from other IOs, member states will lose some of their control over the organization.…”