Managing elite defection in Museveni’s Uganda: the 2016 elections in perspective

Khisa, Moses

doi:10.4324/9781315136059-3

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…The president maintains a well-funded, equipped, and trained coercive apparatus made up of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), Uganda Police, and various paramilitary organisations, which effectively project state power across the country (Reuss and Titeca, 2017: 10). The increasingly frequent, if unpredictable (Khisa, 2021;Tapscott, 2021), application of force has helped to embed NRM dominance in the Ugandan political culture (Vokes and Wilkins, 2016: 593) in addition to providing this coercive apparatus with valuable hands-on experiencebolstered by participation in peacekeeping missions abroadwhich has further increased its capabilities (Fisher and Anderson, 2016: 67).…”

Section: Karamoja and "The Rest Of Uganda"mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By 2010, the government had achieved most of its disarmament objectives. The UPDF's spokesperson wrote at the time that it had “carried out a successful disarmament programme” (Kulayigye, 2010). Brigadier Patrick Kankiriho, the commander of the Karamoja-based UPDF 3rd Division, predicted: “Very soon we shall declare Karamoja free from illegal guns.…”

Section: Disarmament and The Coercive Apparatus Of The Ugandan State ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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State Capacity and Elite Enrichment in Uganda's Northeastern Periphery

Czuba

2023

Africa Spectrum

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In the mid-2000s, Uganda's authoritarian National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime set out to extend state control over Karamoja, a long-neglected region in the northeast of the country. This effort has involved large-scale deployment of security personnel, investment in an expansive administrative system used to subdue the local population, and construction of physical infrastructure that connects Karamoja with the rest of Uganda and facilitates the exploitation of the region's natural resources by members of the political elite. Government bodies in Karamoja capably perform functions that benefit the NRM elite and regime; other government responsibilities, notably for public service provision, have been assumed by non-state organisations. This article shows that the unevenness of state capacity in the region is the result of a coherent strategy that the regime has implemented across Uganda; developments in Karamoja illuminate this strategy and, thereby, help to account for the apparent incongruity of the country's political system.

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Section: Karamoja and "The Rest Of Uganda"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Disarmament and The Coercive Apparatus Of The Ugandan State ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

State Capacity and Elite Enrichment in Uganda's Northeastern Periphery

Czuba

2023

Africa Spectrum

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“…Cross-national quantitative studies have argued that defections are caused by economic crisis (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Reuter and Gandhi 2011). Qualitative case studies, meanwhile, have focused either on the role of electoral competition (Langston 2006), economic liberalization (Balmaceda 2013; Junisbai 2012; Radnitz 2010), or the contextual strategies used by autocrats (Khisa 2016; Schedler and Hoffmann 2016).…”

Section: Authoritarian Stability and Elite Cohesionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

Reuter

Szakonyi

2019

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Elite cohesion is a fundamental pillar of authoritarian stability. High-level defections can signal weakness, embolden the opposition, and sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a dataset of 4,291 ruling party candidates in Russia, this paper develops and tests hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theory predicts that ruling elites defect when there is greater uncertainty about the regime’s willingness to provide spoils. Regimes that share power with the opposition, limit access to spoils, and lack formal institutions see more defections. Co-opting the opposition assuages outside threats but leaves regime insiders disgruntled and prone to defection. Those with personal followings and business connections are the most likely to defect, since they can pursue their political goals independently of the regime. Taken together, our results highlight important tradeoffs among authoritarian survival strategies. Many of the steps autocrats take to repel challenges simultaneously heighten the risk of defections.

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Managing elite defection in Museveni’s Uganda: the 2016 elections in perspective

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

State Capacity and Elite Enrichment in Uganda's Northeastern Periphery

State Capacity and Elite Enrichment in Uganda's Northeastern Periphery

Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

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