Managing diversity by creating team identity

Eckel, Catherine C.; Grossman, Philip J.

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.01.003

Cited by 370 publications

(300 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(14 reference statements)

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“…Most previous research explains parochial altruism by beginning with the assumption that multiple cultural groups coexist [4,7,8,10,[15][16][17]. Recent research extends this by showing that cultural groups can emerge endogenously [13], and that these groups display parochial altruism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation during cultural group formation promotes trust towards members of out-groups

Pan

Houser

2013

Proc. R. Soc. B.

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People often cooperate with members of their own group, and discriminate against members of other groups. Previous research establishes that cultural groups can form endogenously, and that these groups demonstrate ingroup favouritism. Given the presence of cultural groups, the previous literature argues that cultural evolution selects for groups that exhibit parochial altruism. The source of initial variation in these traits, however, remains uninformed. We show here that a group's economic production environment may substantially influence parochial tendencies, with groups formed around more cooperative production (CP) displaying less parochialism than groups formed around more independent production (IP) processes. Participants randomized into CP and IP production tasks formed cultural groups, and subsequently played hidden-action trust games with in-group and outgroup trustees. We found CP to be associated with significantly greater sharing and exchanging behaviours than IP. In trust games, significant parochial altruism (in-group favouritism combined with out-group discrimination) was displayed by members of IP groups. By contrast, members of CP groups did not engage in either in-group favouritism or out-group discrimination. Further, we found the absence of out-group discrimination in CP to persist even following 'betrayal'. Finally, belief data suggest that members of CP are not more intrinsically generous than IP members, but rather more likely to believe that out-group trustees will positively reciprocate. Our results have important implications for anyone interested in building cooperative teams, and shed new light on connections between culture and cooperation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation during cultural group formation promotes trust towards members of out-groups

Pan

Houser

2013

Proc. R. Soc. B.

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“…However, these studies are largely based on results obtained in a laboratory setting. These laboratory results show that participants with a salient group identity contribute more to public goods under the voluntary contribution mechanism (Eckel and Grossman, 2005), and coordinate to a more efficient Nash equilibrium in the context of the minimum-effort game (Bornstein et al, 2002;Chen and Chen, 2011), the provision point mechanism (Croson et al, 2008) and the Battle of the Sexes (Charness et al, 2007).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 78%

“…Our research question is whether team competition increases pro-social behavior in the field. A large body of experimental research in economics and social psychology has demonstrated that the existence of identity-based teams can increase public goods provision (Eckel and Grossman, 2005) and improve coordination (Bornstein et al, 2002;Croson et al, 2008;Chen and Chen, 2011). 3 However, one limitation of this research is that it has been conducted in a laboratory setting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance

Chen

Yan

Liu

et al. 2017

Games and Economic Behavior

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We investigate the effects of team competition on pro-social lending activity on Kiva.org, the first microlending website to match lenders with entrepreneurs in developing countries. Using naturally occurring field data, we find that lenders who join teams contribute 1.2 more loans ($30-$42) per month than those who do not. To further explore factors that differentiate successful teams from dormant ones, we run a large-scale randomized field experiment (n = 22, 233) by posting forum messages. Compared to the control, we find that lenders make significantly more loans when exposed to a goal-setting and coordination message, whereas goal-setting alone significantly increases lending activities of previously inactive teams. Our findings suggest that goal-setting and coordination are effective mechanisms to increase pro-social behavior in teams.JEL Classification: C1, C93, D64, H41

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“…Similarly, Charness et al (2007) nd that in-group preferences are stronger when an individual's choices are observed (passively) by in-group members, whereas arbitrarily labeling groups and identifying them with colors or numbers is not enough to create an in-group bias in Prisoner's Dilemma and battle-of-the-sexes games. Eckel and Grossman (2005) compare the e ects of several methods for creating group identity in a laboratory experiment, comparing cooperation in a public good game played under various degrees of induced group identity, including arbitrary group identity (in which groups are formed randomly then labeled by color only), as well as treatments in which identity is strengthened through joint participation in problem-solving tasks, and competition in a tournament (in which the group with the highest contribution to the 1 As Chen and Li (2009) point out, the classic de nition of the minimal group paradigm requires that any decisions made by a subject should not directly a ect her own payo . However this condition is violated in most economic experiments that use similar methods to induce group identity in the lab.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our approach is similar to Eckel and Grossman (2005) in that we use competition as a means of making group identity more salient. However, our design di ers in two key respects.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Beekman

Cheung

Levely

2017

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We study cooperation within and between groups in the laboratory, comparing treatments in which two groups have previously been (i) in conflict with one another, (ii) in conflict with a different group, or (iii) not previously exposed to conflict. We model conflict using an intergroup Tullock contest, and measure its effects upon cooperation using a multi-level public good game. We demonstrate that conflict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between groups. Moreover, we find that cooperation between groups increases in response to an increase in the efficiency gains from cooperation only when the two groups have not previously interacted.JEL Classification: C92, D64, D74, H41

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Managing diversity by creating team identity

Cited by 370 publications

References 31 publications

Cooperation during cultural group formation promotes trust towards members of out-groups

Cooperation during cultural group formation promotes trust towards members of out-groups

Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance

The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

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