Managing a Portfolio of Public–Private Partnerships: Concessionaire Perspective

Albornoz, Vicente Alcaraz Carrillo de; Millán, Juan Molina; Soliño, Antonio Sánchez

doi:10.1061/(asce)me.1943-5479.0000651

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Theoretical studies [6][7][8][9] proposed a mathematical model based on agency theory in order to analyze road infrastructure management systems. A given model uses the quality indicators of the road condition to establish payment to the contractor.…”

Section: Literature Review and Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is also assumed that there is a relationship between the efforts of the agent and the levels of operational quality. The analysis of the optimal incentive mechanism was performed on the basis of a series of parameters characterizing the economic environment and specific conditions of road infrastructure [8]. In that model, the principal's objective function is the social welfare function, which the principal tries to maximize by selecting the parameters that determine the mechanism of remuneration of the contractor.…”

Section: Literature Review and Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Paper [7] reports a mechanism for payment under contracts but requires clarification of the risk model. The models described in [8] are not described in detail by time parameters, which makes it difficult to take into conside ration the risks of long-term maintenance of roads. In [9], analytical methods and simulations are used that require a large number of input parameters.…”

Section: Literature Review and Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Construction of a simulation model for substantiating the parameters of long-term road maintenance contracts

Kanin

Kharchenko

Tsybulskyi

et al. 2022

EEJET

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This paper reports a study into the main parameters of long-term contracts for the maintenance of roads. Weaknesses in existing methods and models of substantiation of the initial characteristics of contracts have been identified. It is established that the main reason for the transition to long-term contacts in the road sector is the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of road asset management. This determines the main goal to maintain the operational condition of all components of roads at a level that ensures the satisfaction of user requirements and contributes to the preservation of assets. A simulation model for substantiating the parameters of long-term contracts for road maintenance has been built, which makes it possible to simulate forecast assessments of the characteristics of contracts. Underlying this study is the Monte Carlo method, as well as the triangular law of distribution, models of deterioration and restoration of the condition of road elements. Taking into consideration these models, it was established that the error in justifying the parameters of long-term contracts according to the devised method is up to 10 %. The devised model was tested by applying the developed original LTCsimula program using an example of the section of a motorway with a length of 87.3 km with an average level of requirements. According to the results of the test, the assessment of the laws of distribution of value, as well as the amount of deductions and profits of a long-term contract, was carried out. The calculation results demonstrated the model’s capability to determine the strategies for the maintenance of roads, taking into consideration the risk of implementing a contract with an error of up to 3.9 %. The practical use of the devised simulation model makes it possible to improve the efficiency of operational maintenance of roads, as well as to save from 10 % to 40 % of the cost of road maintenance

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Section: Literature Review and Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Review and Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Review and Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Construction of a simulation model for substantiating the parameters of long-term road maintenance contracts

Kanin

Kharchenko

Tsybulskyi

et al. 2022

EEJET

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“…They are the principal shareholders and are in charge of committing equity (i.e., typically between 5% and 30% of the contract value) and securing a proper risk management structure for lenders to be able to provide non-recourse debt (Grimsey and Lewis 2004;Sugawara and Nikaido 2014). Based on that, sponsors are at higher financial risk, as the rate of return on the equity is higher than on the debt (Carrillo de Albornoz et al 2018;Owolabi et al 2020).…”

Section: Sponsors In the Ppp Procurement Stagementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this sense, weak SPVs may generate project difficulties that manifest themselves in poor project administration, delivery time delays, and cost overruns (Osei-Kyei and Chan 2015; Owolabi et al 2020). For such reasons, sponsors must seek partners with whom project-related risks may be mitigated (Carrillo de Albornoz et al 2018;Grimsey and Lewis 2004) and with whom they can improve their effectiveness and achieve competitive advantages (Delhi and Mahalingam 2020;Edkins and Smyth 2006;Wang and Zhang 2019). In line with that, a key challenge for sponsors interested in PPP projects is finding bidding partners with sufficient funds, reputation, and the capacity to compete in PPP markets (Burke and Demirag 2019;Guevara et al 2020b;Osei-Kyei et al 2018).…”

Section: Sponsors In the Ppp Procurement Stagementioning

confidence: 99%

Inferential Analysis of Road Infrastructure PPP Sponsor Networks

2021

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In the road infrastructure sector, public-private partnership (PPP) projects involve the implementation of project finance principles through the signing of a long-term contract between the public authority and a group of sponsors assembled in a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). However, although PPP sponsors play a very important role in SPV formation, the literature does not provide ample evidence to understand such creation processes. Therefore, this study gains insight into the mechanisms associated with the way PPP sponsors establish relationships among themselves in order to form SPVs. The approach employs social network concepts and Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) techniques. The analysis is focused on tie-formation processes in sponsor networks across the bidding and financial close stages of road PPP projects in Canada, Chile, and the US between 1993 and 2019. Results show that, despite some differences in the studied jurisdictions, dyadic (i.e., repeated relationships) and structural (i.e., transitivity) factors are the most influential properties driving bidding consortium and SPV creation procedures. Conclusions indicate that sponsors' behavioral patterns are highly influenced by trust-based mechanisms. Further research is required to continue understanding the role of other PPP players and the effect of the external institutional environment on PPP networks.

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Building an Institutional Model of Interaction Between Government and Business in Public-Private Partnership

Yatsechko

2019

Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems

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Managing a Portfolio of Public–Private Partnerships: Concessionaire Perspective

Cited by 11 publications

References 20 publications

Construction of a simulation model for substantiating the parameters of long-term road maintenance contracts

Construction of a simulation model for substantiating the parameters of long-term road maintenance contracts

Inferential Analysis of Road Infrastructure PPP Sponsor Networks

Building an Institutional Model of Interaction Between Government and Business in Public-Private Partnership

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