Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions

Abstract

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Herding Among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence

“…Although not the situation modeled here, Hirshleifer (1993) points out that in certain situations it may be reasonable to think of dumb agents' information as being more positively correlated than smart agents' information, which can lead to anti-herding.…”

Physical Characteristics of the Chief Executive Officer and Firm Accounting and Market-Based Performance

“…Also, it is argued that a senior CEO will reduce a firm's risk by investing in less vulnerable projects (Serfling 2013). Moreover, senior CEOs have a competitive edge over their younger counterparts who primarily focus on short-term goals for improving their reputation (Hirshleifer 1993;Peni 2012). Despite weak physical stamina, senior CEOs are still considered safe hands and sufficiently competent to manage firms better than their younger counterparts (Evans 2005) 1 .…”

CEO Characteristics and Valuation of the Organization: A Quantile Regression Analysis

“…Specifically, models incorporating career concerns predict that younger CEOs are more risk averse because they do not yet have reputations as high quality managers (Hirshleifer, 1993). As such, younger CEO's can be punished more harshly for poor performance through markedly reduced future career opportunities, which can induce them to adopt more conservative investment policies.…”