Managerial myopia and firm productivity: Evidence from China

Managerial myopia and outward foreign direct investment: Evidence from Chinese listed firms

“…Senior executives' attributes will greatly affect the firm's disclosure characteristic (Lewis et al, 2014; Marquez‐Illescas et al, 2019), so the text of MD&A could well reflect the cognition of senior executives. Sheng et al (2022) measured the managerial myopia of Chinese listed firms using this analytical method. The construction steps of managerial myopia is as follows.…”

“…However, due to the endowment effect, myopic managers can hardly bear the consequences of the failure of high‐risk investment projects, although these projects are conducive to firms' long‐term growth. For instance, myopic managers will reduce R&D investment because it brings great uncertainty to firms (Chintrakarn et al, 2016; Sheng et al, 2022). Therefore, as higher risks accompany OFDI, myopic managers may be more inclined to use relatively certain short‐term profits to achieve the continuation of their careers due to the influence of the endowment effect.…”

“…It is partially affected by the acquired environment (Holman & Zimbardo, 2009). Previous literature shows that managers have myopic behavior that weakens strategic persistence (Ridge et al, 2014), sacrifices complex long‐term investment (Chatjuthamard et al, 2022), and leads to lower research and development (R&D) investment (Sheng et al, 2022). In the era of economic globalization, what impact will managerial myopia have on firms' OFDI?…”

Does managerial short-termism always matter in a firm's corporate social responsibility performance? Evidence from China

“…In a similar vein, it is demonstrated that even in a fully efficient market, managers may behave myopically if they care about stock prices over a near-term horizon [ 9 , 38 ]. Holmstrom and Costa in 1986 proposed a similar model where superiors learn about talent by observing project performance [ 39 , 40 ]. A series of studies investigated that managerial short-termism leads to short-sighted value reducing actions [ 32 , 41 , 42 ].…”

Are scholar-type CEOs more conducive to promoting industrial AI transformation of manufacturing companies?

“…The specific logic is as follows: First, as an important manifestation of strengthening the power allocation of subsidiary executives, the parent-subsidiary corporations executives' ties has a positive effect on stimulating missionalism and stewardship mentality of subsidiary CEOs (Belenzon et al, 2019;Xu et al, 2019). Scholar-type CEOs can more effectively avoid adverse selection and moral hazard problems by correcting short-sighted behavior and are better able to give full play to their innovative thinking mode to effectively capture the signals of policy changes and gain insight into the future prospects of AI applications, and then more funds will be invested in long-term industrial AI transformation projects (Sheng et al, 2022). Second, in response to the "financing constraint" problem, enterprise groups can give full play to the functions of the internal capital market through the parent-subsidiary corporations executives' ties Industrial AI transformation (Kabbach-de-Castro et al, 2022), and the scholar-type CEOs under the mechanism of the parentsubsidiary corporations executives' ties have a higher degree of control over social resources, provide more adequate and lasting financial support for the AI projects of listed subsidiaries.…”