Managerial entrenchment, equity payout and capital structure

Wang, Hao

doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.07.018

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 39 publications

(51 reference statements)

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“…Also, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) pointed that dividend decision in cash cow firms are not influenced by institutional shareholders and this circumstance make these firms are usually focus on growth to their dividend and often to avoid cutting it. In contrast, managers in cash cow firms tend to hold cash balances and choose low payout dividends to their shareholders (Wang, 2011). In this case, conflict is possible because Chang and Wong (2004) explained, cash cow firms usually controlled by major shareholders in term to fulfill their interests and make the firms as collateral to borrow money from banks.…”

Section: Cash Cow Firmmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Ownership on Behavior of Dividend Payers

Saerang

Pontoh

2016

JLECON

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The objectives of this study are to give empirical evidences about cash cow firms and free cash flow theory. Conducting compare means paired samples t test and logistic regression with samples of 141 firms which listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for period 2009 to 2014, this study proves dividend payers in Indonesia are not cash cows and ownership has role in determining behavior behind dividend policy. Firms with individuals and/or public ownership both for larger and smaller size shall pay dividends for some other intentions, but firms with institutional and/or state ownership concerns with its size shall pay dividends because : first, they are not at cash cows status or not under circumstance of internal conflict; second, they shall behave like cash cows in order of conflict avoidance

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Section: Cash Cow Firmmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Ownership on Behavior of Dividend Payers

Saerang

Pontoh

2016

JLECON

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“…Bai and Wang (1998) argue that financial leverage in China's state-owned enterprises reflects Kornai's (1980) soft-budget constraint that adversely affects firm performance. Wang (2011) suggests that the interaction of financial leverage with managerial entrenchment affects the firm's payout policy and shareholder value. In addition, the timing of a firm's incorporation might also have a link to its performance, because it might reflect the firm's stage of development and hence can be associated with certain levels or patterns of production.…”

Section: Empirical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China’s reform experiment

Meng

Ning

Zhou

et al. 2011

Journal of Banking & Finance

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a b s t r a c tChina introduced employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in 1992 purely as an employee incentive scheme. The government initiated the policy experiment on ESOPs as part of China's reform of its state-owned enterprises, and it was abruptly terminated 2 years after initiation. This policy experiment resulted in an exogenous sample of ESOPs that allows us to provide the first evidence from Chinese firms on the performance-ESOP relation. After examining a variety of performance measures, including ROA, ROE, Tobin's q, and productivity, we find little difference in performance between ESOP firms and non-ESOP firms.

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“…Teori agensi menyatakan bahwa pengawasan pada perusahaan secara efektif akan menghindari tindakan ekspropriasi asset oleh manajer. Manajerial Entrenchment adalah kondisi dimana tata kelola perusahaan dan mekanisme control yang lemah (Wang, 2011). Kemudian literatur lain menyatakan bahwa dalam menghadapi mekanisme pemantauan yang tidak efektif dan ketersediaan peluang, manajer dapat mengikuti kepentingan mereka dengan mengorbankan investor.…”

Section: Kajian Literatur Dan Pengembangan Hipotesis Manajerial Entrenchmentunclassified

Corporate Social Responsibility Dan Earnings Management: Managerial Entrenchment Sebagai Variabel Moderasi

Khosasi

Eriandani

2021

j. ilm. akunt.

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Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan menguji pengaruh managerial entrenchment terhadap hubungan tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan (CSR) dengan praktik manajemen laba. Data yang digunakan adalah semua perusahaan sektor manufaktur yang terdaftar di BEI periode 2016-2018. Proksi yang digunakan untuk mengukur managerial entrenchment adalah kepemilikan saham CEO dan masa jabatan CEO. Pengolahan data menggunakan moderated regression analysis. Hasil penelitian yang diperoleh menyatakan bahwa tanggungjawab sosial perusahaan berpengaruh negatif terhadap manajemen laba, sedangkan masa jabatan CEO dan kepemilikan saham CEO tidak memberikan pengaruh terhadap hubungan tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan dengan manajemen laba. Selain itu, pada penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa masa jabatan CEO memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan terhadap kesenjangan tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan. Penelitian ini memberikan implikasi bahwa walaupun managerial entrenchment tidak merusak hubungan CSR dan tindakan manajemen laba, namun managerial entrenchment menentukan jenis aktifitas CSR yang dilakukan perusahaan. Abstract: This study aims to examine the effect of managerial entrenchment on the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and earnings management practices. The data used are all manufacturing sector companies listed on the IDX for the 2016-2018 period. The proxies used to measure managerial entrenchment are CEO's share ownership and CEO's tenure. Data processing using moderated regression analysis. The results obtained indicate that corporate social responsibility harms earnings management. At the same time, the tenure of the CEO and CEO's share ownership does not affect the relationship between corporate social responsibility and earnings management. In addition, this study also found that CEO tenure has a significant influence on the corporate social responsibility gap. This study implies that although managerial entrenchment does not damage the relationship between CSR and earnings management actions, managerial entrenchment determines the company's types of CSR activities.

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Managerial entrenchment, equity payout and capital structure

Cited by 15 publications

References 39 publications

The Role of Ownership on Behavior of Dividend Payers

The Role of Ownership on Behavior of Dividend Payers

Do ESOPs enhance firm performance? Evidence from China’s reform experiment

Corporate Social Responsibility Dan Earnings Management: Managerial Entrenchment Sebagai Variabel Moderasi

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