Managerial effort incentives, X-inefficiency and international trade

Horn, Henrik; Lang, Harald; Lundgren, Stefan

doi:10.1016/0014-2921(94)00022-r

Cited by 62 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The second is the analysis of the impact of product-market competition on managerial slack (Hart, 1983;Horn et al, 1995;Tirole, 1988;Vickers, 1995;Winter, 1971). The third involves conflict between actors (Grossman, 1991;Grossman and Kim, 1995;Hausken, 2000;Hirshleifer, 1995;Neary, 1997;Skaperdas, 1992;Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1997;Usher, 1992;Usher and Engineer, 1987;Noh, 1998). Consider two groups in competition.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Migration and intergroup conflict

Hausken

2000

Economics Letters

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Migration and intergroup conflict

Hausken

2000

Economics Letters

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“…11 We do not need the second inequality in Assumption 2 for any of our substantive results. Without this assumption, there is the possibility that an outsourcing operation may be profitable with no effort from the entrepreneur; this just adds another (uninteresting) case to the analysis.…”

Section: Operating Profits Under Outsourcingmentioning

confidence: 95%

Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production

Grossman

Helpman

2002

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We develop a model in which the heterogeneous firms in an industry choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume that the principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our main result concerns the sorting of firms with different productivity levels into different organizational forms. We use the model to examine the implications of falling trade costs for the relevant prevalence of outsourcing and foreign direct investment.

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“…In order to overcome this pressure, it may need to improve its management performance in order to be able to increase output and penetrate the foreign market. This harks back to the ideas formulated by Horn et al (1995) who show theoretically that opening up to trade increases competition (the number of firms producing the same output), incentivizes firms to produce more output and thus induces managers to provide more effort.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Firms’ global engagement and management practices

Görg

Hanley

2017

Economics Letters

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We investigate whether firms' "global engagement", either in the form of exporting or opening up affiliates abroad, is related to the change in their management performance. We use new and unique data from a recent large scale firm survey of management practices in Germany. We calculate management scores for firms as in Bloom et al. (2013), which indicate how structured management is in a given firm. We find that switching into exporting, and to a lesser degree opening up affiliates abroad, is related to improving management performance in the sense of having more structured management practices. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Managerial effort incentives, X-inefficiency and international trade

Cited by 62 publications

References 13 publications

Migration and intergroup conflict

Migration and intergroup conflict

Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production

Firms’ global engagement and management practices

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