Much Renaissance scholarship over the past few decades has highlighted the period's pre-Cartesian conception of embodied selfhood. In this psychophysiological model of the self, body and mind are understood as intrinsically interrelated, with mental and emotional experience grounded in the humors and spirits of Galenic theory and in psychologically potent organs. At the same time, many cognitive scientists have been working against the dualism of the Cartesian mind-body split. In Descartes' Error , for example, neuroscientist Antonio Damasio explains how in Descartes' theory "thinking and awareness of thinking are the real substrates of being," and thinking is separate from the body, but for Damasio "the self is a repeatedly reconstructed biological state" with a neural basis. 1 As part of the renewed interest across disciplines in the nature of consciousness, the phenomenological approach of philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with its emphasis on fi rst-person lived-body