We examine the "marketability hypothesis," which states that stock splits enhance the attractiveness of shares to investors by restoring prices to a preferred trading range. We examine splits of mutual fund shares because they provide a clean testing ground for the marketability hypothesis, since the conventional rationales for common stock splits do not apply. We find that splitting funds experience significant increases (relative to non-splitting matched funds) in net assets and shareholders. Stock splits do appear to enhance marketability. Although practitioners suggest that marketability is the primary reason for executing a split (e.g., Baker and Gallagher, 1980;Baker and Powell, 1993), few papers have rigorously explored this possibility. However, academic research on common stock splits has found some support for the marketability hypothesis. For example, Lamoureux and Poon (1987) and Maloney and Mulherin (1992) report that the number of shareholders increases following common stock splits. Schultz (1999) shows that the number of small orders increases following a stock split, and that the bulk of these orders are buys.2 Angel, Brooks, and Mathew (1997) show that trading activity by small investors increases following a stock split. Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt (1999) show that firms going public appear to use the offering price to influence investor interest in the issue. The evidence on common stock splits is also consistent with competing explanations, such as the trading-range hypothesis (Lakonishok and Lev, 1987;McNichols and Dravid, 1990), the signaling hypothesis (Asquith, Healy, and Palepu, 1989;Desai and Jain , 1997) or a fusion of the two (Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice, 1996).According to the trading-range hypothesis, roundlot constraints and transaction cost considerations result in a preferred price level, which is restored by the split. According to the signaling hypothesis, managers implement stock splits to communicate favorable private information about the firm's prospects.However, these competing explanations do not fit very well the case of mutual fund splits.3 Existing transaction cost and constraint-driven explanations of a trading range do not apply, since mutual funds do not trade in ticks and any transaction costs or trade size restrictions are not related to share prices. Also, 1 We thank Chris James for suggesting this leader. 2 Schultz (1999) finds no support for tick-size explanations f o r s t o c k s p l i t s . H e c o n c l u d e s t h a t s p l i t s b r o a d e n t h e shareholder base by encouraging purchases of the firm's stock especially among small investors. However, Porter a n d We a v e r ( 1 9 9 7 ) c o n c l u d e t h a t a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e minimum tick size by the Toronto Stock Exchange reduced trade execution costs and may benefit small traders. 3 Excepting the recent paper by Rozeff (1998), mutual fund splits have not been widely studied in the academic literature. They were noticed early by Barker (1956).