Management by Objectives and Results in the Nordic Countries: Continuity and Change, Differences and Similarities

Hvordan anvender kommunale chefer resultatinformation?

“…Den lave grad af anvendelse af resultatkontrakter kan umiddelbart virke overraskende, idet resultatkontrakter er saerdeles udbredt i fx den statslige sektor (Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2009;Kristiansen, 2015Kristiansen, , 2017aKristiansen, , 2017b. En tolkning af det forholdsvis lave niveau kan vaere, at resultatkontrakter i højere grad anvendes på de højeste ledelsesniveauer, at der i kommunerne anvendes andre begreber for denne mere aftalebaserede form for styring, eller simpelthen fordi den kontraktbaserede styring i lavere grad er slået igennem i den kommunale sektor sammenlignet med den statslige.…”

Agency control or autonomy? Government steering of Swedish government agencies 2003–2017

“…Research on organizational autonomy in the public sector can be found in the field of public management and organizational studies, and survey methodologies are often used to measure perceptual data on organizational autonomy and control of government agencies (Verschuere 2007;Verhoest et al 2012;Maggetti and Verhoest 2014). Within this research field we find studies that investigate the distinction between formal and factual autonomy of agencies (Verhoest et al 2004;Yesilkagit and Van Thiel 2008), the use of management instruments (Verhoest and Wynen 2018), and ministerial control through performance contracts (Binderkrantz and Christensen 2009;Kristiansen 2015;Askim, Bjurstrøm, and Kjaervik 2019). Our contribution to this field is our explanatory approach using large-N data, where we investigate how different agency-level characteristics that allow higher or lesser agency autonomy explain the level of interventional autonomy in the form of government results control.…”

“…On the other hand, in contrast to the paradox argument, it could also be argued that the issue at hand is not so much a government strategy of balancing autonomy and control of every government agency, but rather that the level of government control corresponds to the type of state agency targeted (Kristiansen 2015;Askim et al 2019). The government's demand for performance information is in these studies found to be in part contextually determined and varies across factors such as agency size, task, and political salience (Pollitt et al 2004;Verhoest et al 2010;cf.…”

“…The government's demand for performance information is in these studies found to be in part contextually determined and varies across factors such as agency size, task, and political salience (Pollitt et al 2004;Verhoest et al 2010;cf. Van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2014;Kristiansen 2015;Askim et al 2019). For instance, politically salient agencies can attract a lot of governmental attention, and salience is in turn linked to developments on the political agenda and to (large) budgets or costs (Verhoest et al 2010).…”

Mellan kunskap och politik : Kvalitetssystem och offentlig kunskapsstyrning i hälso- och sjukvården

“…Kristiansen (2015) undersöker spårberoendet i mål-och resultatstyrning i den offentliga sektorn i Danmark, Norge och Sverige. Länderna uppvisar likheter när det gäller att stabiliteten i mål och resultatstyrningen kan förklaras av höga kostnader för att byta spår och att starka aktörer har varit anhängare till modellen.…”