Man in the Middle and Current Injection Attacks Against the KLJN Key Exchanger Compromised by DC Sources

Melhem, Mutaz Y.; Kish, László B.

doi:10.1142/s0219477521500115

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 90 publications

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“…Several potential security vulnerabilities of the KLJN system have been addressed in previous research [4,42,[73][74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82][83][84][85][86]. However, in each case it was shown that these attacks do not compromise the unconditional security of the KLJN scheme because, similarly to quantum encryption, the information leak can be eliminated by defense hardware and privacy amplification.…”

Section: { } M a Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a subsequent work [78], additional security risks of these DC sources were studied under two active attacks: the man-in-the-middle attack and the current-injection-attack. The conclusion of these analyses is that parasitic DC sources do not increase the feasibility and information leak related to these active attacks.…”

Section: Loop Current Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, in each case it was shown that these attacks do not compromise the unconditional security of the KLJN scheme because, similarly to quantum encryption, the information leak can be eliminated by defense hardware and privacy amplification. The attacks can be classified into three main categories: active attacks [4,42,46,73,74,88]; passive attacks (utilizing non-ideal conditions) [43,[75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82][83][84][85][86][87]; and flawed attack attempts [87][88][89][90][91][92][93] that were also useful for a deeper understanding of the security features and robustness of the method.…”

Section: { } M a Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Alternating (AC) Loop Current Attacks Against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme

et al. 2021

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Recently, several passive and active attack methods have been proposed against the Kirchhoff–Law–Johnson–Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme by utilizing direct (DC) loop currents. The DC current attacks are relatively easy, but their practical importance is low. On the other hand, parasitic alternating (AC) currents are virtually omnipresent in wire-based systems. Such situations exist due to AC ground loops and electromagnetic interference (EMI). However, utilizing AC currents for attacks is a harder problem. Here, we introduce and demonstrate AC current attacks in various frequency ranges. The attacks exploit a parasitic/periodic AC voltage-source at either Alice’s or Bob’s end. In the low-frequency case, the procedure is the generalized form of the former DC ground-loop-based attack. In the high-frequency case, the power density spectrum of the wire voltage is utilized. The attack is demonstrated in both the low and the high-frequency situations. Defense protocols against the attack are also discussed.

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Section: { } M a Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Loop Current Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: { } M a Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Alternating (AC) Loop Current Attacks Against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme

et al. 2021

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“…74 In the vast body of literature, similarly to the field of QKD, there are attacks, defense techniques, and debates about them. Some of the attacks utilize non-ideal component features that can cause miniscule information leak which can be nullified [75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82][83][84][85][86] by design and/or privacy amplification. 43,52 Some attacks are invalid, (e.g.…”

Section: The Kirchhoff-law-johnson-noise (Kljn) Key Exchangementioning

confidence: 99%

Perspective—On the thermodynamics of perfect unconditional security

Chamon

Kish

2021

Applied Physics Letters

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A secure key distribution (exchange) scheme is unconditionally secure if it is unbreakable against arbitrary technological improvements of computing power and/or any development of new algorithms.There are only two families of experimentally realized and tested unconditionally secure key distribution technologies: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), the base of quantum cryptography, which utilizes quantum physical photonic features; and the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) system that is based on classical statistical physics (fluctuation-dissipation theorem). The focus topic of this paper is the thermodynamical situation of the KLJN system. In all the original works, the proposed KLJN schemes required thermal equilibrium between the devices of the communicating parties to achieve perfect security. However, Vadai, et al, in (Nature) Science Reports 5 ( 2015) 13653 shows a modified scheme, where there is a non-zero thermal noise energy flow between the parties, yet the system seems to resist all the known attack types. We introduce a new attack type against their system. The new attack utilizes coincidence events between the line current and voltages. We show that there is non-zero information leak toward the Eavesdropper, even under idealized conditions. As soon as the thermal equilibrium is restored, the system becomes perfectly secure again. In conclusion, perfect unconditional security requires thermal equilibrium.

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Transient attacks against the Kirchhoff–Law–Johnson–Noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger

Ferdous

Kish

2023

Applied Physics Letters

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We demonstrate the security vulnerability of an ideal Kirchhoff–Law–Johnson–Noise key exchanger against transient attacks. Transients start when Alice and Bob connect a wire to their chosen resistor at the beginning of each clock cycle. A transient attack takes place during a short duration of time, before the transients reflected from the end of Alice and Bob mix together. The information leak arises from the fact that Eve (the eavesdropper) monitors the cable and analyzes the transients during this time period. We will demonstrate such a transient attack, and then, we introduce a defense protocol to protect against the attack. Computer simulations demonstrate that after applying the defense method the information leak becomes negligible.

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Man in the Middle and Current Injection Attacks Against the KLJN Key Exchanger Compromised by DC Sources

Cited by 8 publications

References 90 publications

Alternating (AC) Loop Current Attacks Against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme

Alternating (AC) Loop Current Attacks Against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme

Perspective—On the thermodynamics of perfect unconditional security

Transient attacks against the Kirchhoff–Law–Johnson–Noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger

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