2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2015.07.004
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Man-in-the-browser-cache: Persisting HTTPS attacks via browser cache poisoning

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Cited by 37 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…In [28], the authors implement an IoT-based health prescription assistant and achieve user authentication and access control on their system. However, the data confidentiality is not considered during the transmission process [29]. Although they have reduced some communication and computation latency in their small-scale data experiment, it is still not enough for real world network with super large amount of data [30].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [28], the authors implement an IoT-based health prescription assistant and achieve user authentication and access control on their system. However, the data confidentiality is not considered during the transmission process [29]. Although they have reduced some communication and computation latency in their small-scale data experiment, it is still not enough for real world network with super large amount of data [30].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Particularly in case CORS is not used in conjunction with the integrity checks, these information leakages may allow an attacker to eventually guess authentication details [36], for instance. In addition to these three explicitly mentioned weaknesses, so-called browser cache poisoning may potentially circumvent the integrity checks [18]. As always, there may be also other already known or yet unknown weaknesses affecting the subresource integrity standard.…”
Section: Integrity Of Cross-origin Javascriptsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on this information, the adversary is capable of determining who is the initiator/responder and further infer the exact video that the victim is watching. In addition, it turns out that BemTV does not guarantee the content integrity between peers in the network, which opens up possibilities for content pollution attacks [47,51,61]. Besides BemTV, we have also carried out inference attacks on another video streaming service called P2PSP [16].…”
Section: Inference Attacks and Real-world Examplesmentioning
confidence: 99%