Malebranche on Intelligible Extension: A Programmatic Interpretation

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is exegesis. I explicate Nicholas Malebranche’s concept of intelligible extension. I begin by detailing how the concept matured throughout Malebranche’s work, and the new functions it took on within his metaphysical system. I then examine Gustav Bergmann’s (1956. “Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Malebranche.” The Review of Metaphysics 10(2): 207–26) “axiomatic” interpretation, as well as the criticism of it offered by Daise Radner (1994. “Malebranche and the Individuation of Perceptual Objects.” In Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Kenneth F. Barber, and Jorge J. E. Gracia, New York: SUNY Press). I argue that Radner’s criticism of the interpretation is only partly successful; some of her objections can be met; others cannot. I then develop a novel interpretation of the concept, given insights from this dispute. I call it the “programmatic interpretation.” I argue that this interpretation coheres well with Malebranche’s famous Vision in God thesis, as well as many of his other commitments. I conclude by considering a certain pertinent objection to my proposal, summarizing the dialectic, and forcefully restating my case.

An Intuitive Solution to the Problem of Induction

“…Note also that commonsense intuition is the heir of the early moderns, who, as we have discussed, rejected the Aristotelian picture of inductive formal perception, and not always for great reasons (cf. Malebranche 1674, III.ii.2;Bassford 2020b). Now that the doctrine of epagoge has been explicated, I'll next show how it is able to overcome the third objection to the natural kinds account, the one which specifically targeted Lange's modification to it.…”