Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory

Abstract

Episodic memory often is conceptualized as a uniquely human system of long-term memory that makes available knowledge accompanied by the temporal and spatial context in which that knowledge was acquired. Retrieval from episodic memory entails a form of first–person subjectivity called autonoetic consciousness that provides a sense that a recollection was something that took place in the experiencer's personal past. In this paper I expand on this definition of episodic memory. Specifically, I suggest that (1) the core features assumed unique to episodic memory are shared by semantic memory, (2) episodic memory cannot be fully understood unless one appreciates that episodic recollection requires the coordinated function of a number of distinct, yet interacting, “enabling” systems. Although these systems—ownership, self, subjective temporality, and agency—are not traditionally viewed as memorial in nature, each is necessary for episodic recollection and jointly they may be sufficient, and (3) the type of subjective awareness provided by episodic recollection (autonoetic) is relational rather than intrinsic—i.e., it can be lost in certain patient populations, thus rendering episodic memory content indistinguishable from the content of semantic long-term memory.

Autonoetic consciousness: Reconsidering the role of episodic memory in future-oriented self-projection

“…Although in many-though not all-cases, relearned material shows less detail than the original, this difference can be accommodated by consideration of the known effects of time in storage on content detail and specificity (for example, multiple trace theory; e.g., Nadel, Hupbach, Gomez, & Newman-Smith, 2012;Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; for a related view see Dalla Barba, 2002). Although discussion would take us far afield, the relevance of multiple trace theory (and kindred treatments) to the issues at hand can be found in Klein (2013c).…”

“…'s memory reports (treated more fully in Klein, 2013c, andNichols, 2013) show all the presumed characteristics of episodic recollection, save one important thing-they lack autonoetic accompaniment. They contain detailed temporal, spatial, and self-referential elements that correctly track (all of R.B.…”

“…To so qualify, content must be joined with a prereflective mode of temporal subjectivity (i.e., autonoesis). A practical extension of this position is that content analysis, absent consideration of the mode of temporality in which content is presented to awareness, does not provide a reliable basis for diagnosing the system of memory from which it issues (see Klein, 2013c, in press, and Footnote 3).…”

“…Consider, for example, the case of patient R.B. (e.g., Klein, 2013bKlein, , 2013cKlein & Nichols, 2013). Following an automotive accident, R.B.…”

“…Second, episodic memory is not simply from the past; it is a special way of being about the past (e.g., Klein, 2013b). To qualify as an act of memory, the content in awareness must present itself as a reexperience of a previously entertained experience (e.g., Klein, 2013c;Markowitsch, 2003;Tulving, 1985Tulving, , 2005Wheeler, 2005;Wheeler et al, 1997). This feeling of reexperiencing is prereflectively given to awareness by a concomitant act of autonoesis at retrieval (for evidence, see the section "Autonoetic consciousness is not intrinsic to episodic memory"), rather than as the product of inference or interpretation (of course, if inference subsequently were to evoke-in some unknown manner-autonoetic accompaniment, the content then would be taken as an act of recollection.…”