Making Sense of Divine Simplicity

Abstract

According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is an absolutely simple being lacking any distinct metaphysical parts, properties, or constituents. Although this doctrine was once an essential part of traditional philosophical theology, it is now widely rejected as incoherent. In this paper, I develop an interpretation of the doctrine designed to resolve contemporary concerns about its coherence, as well as to show precisely what is required to make sense of divine simplicity.

Nested Modes, 'Qua' and the Incarnation

“…Consider, after all, a plausible functional characterization of modes: an immediate Fness mode μ of x is an object μ such that μ, or at least x and μ together, 9 fully grounds x's being F. But when x itself fully grounds x being F, then the functional characterization makes x be its own Fness trope. And on the Oppy-Brower-Pruss account of divine simplicity (Oppy 2003;Brower 2008;Pruss 2008), God truthmakes, and hence grounds, all the intrinsic attributes of God. (The question of the extension of that account to non-intrinsic attributes, while indeed a challenge to the proponent of simplicity, is not a special difficulty for our nested mode account of the incarnation.…”

Divine Perfection and Creation

“…The doctrine of divine simplicity is quite controversial these days. While several contemporaries are working on defending a traditional understanding of divine simplicity, it seems to me that divine unity is all we need . The first thing to note is that divine unity is not an attribute, property, or perfection.…”

Dis-positioning Euthyphro

“…Leftow (2012, p. 301). 35 I should note that there have been a number of recent defenses of simplicity, for instance: Dolezal (2011), Brower (2008. 36 See note 22.…”