Making it up as we go along: state-building, critical theory and military adaptation in Afghanistan

Grissom, Adam R.

doi:10.1080/14678802.2010.500535

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…First, US Special Forces trained and funded an Afghan militia force of nearly 45,000 members, outside the scope of the Afghan Security Forces, to combat 'terrorists'. 52 This created another set of powerful actors in the Afghan political spectrum. Second, with 'kill and capture' tactics, aimed more at destroying insurgent capability than defeating their support, US Special Forces often undermined the goodwill that the ISAF 'hearts and minds' strategy aimed to develop.…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The UN and Afghanistan: Contentions in Democratization and Statebuilding

Saikal¹

2012

International Peacekeeping

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Following more than a decade of NATO's intervention in Afghanistan, it is often argued that the UN, alongside its international partners and the Afghan government, has failed to facilitate good governance and a stable democratic political order. In charting the evolving UN role in 'democratizing' Afghanistan, this article analyses why this is so. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), facing considerable historical and institutional constraints, has had neither the will nor the capacity to implement its ambitious democratization mandate. Instead of aiming for a system of governance along 'Western' lines, it should focus primarily on promoting an appropriate, institutionalized, workable political order, regional consensus, and national reconciliation as the necessary foundations for bringing peace and stability to the country.

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Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The UN and Afghanistan: Contentions in Democratization and Statebuilding

Saikal¹

2012

International Peacekeeping

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“…Working with and supporting non-state and ostensibly organic or traditional forms of governance are often presented as more appropriate and effective, as enabling less imposing forms of intervention, and even as more in line with 'critical theory' (Grissom 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nexuses of knowledge and power in Afghanistan: the rise and fall of the informal justice assemblage

Wimpelmann

2013

Central Asian Survey

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This article explores Western attempts to strengthen mechanisms of informal justice in Afghanistan. It traces the origins and evolution of an 'informal justice assemblage': the constellation of specific expert discourses, institutional practices, and strategic considerations that made it possible and plausible that Western actors should promote and work with informal processes of justice. The article problematizes expert statements that posit that working with informal justice is somehow more 'Afghan-led' and less of an outside imposition than supporting the country's formal justice system. To the contrary, this article details how -discursively and institutionally -academic authority about what is locally appropriate in practice served to foreclose national debate and scrutiny about the organization and administration of justice. This amounted to a net erosion of accountability, reinforced by the subsequent militarization of the justice sector and governance more broadly. In conclusion, the article calls for greater attention to the broader fields of power in which claims of sensitivity to the local sentiments and reality in Afghanistan are made.

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Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan : the role of post-conflict reconstruction

Sulaiman¹

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the Taliban have emerged as a strong resistance force against the Afghan government, the US and the International Security Assistance Force-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (ISAF-NATO) -a military coalition of 48 countries. This thesis explores the reasons of resurgence of the Taliban against the US, NATO-ISAF and the Afghan government. It argues that this revival of the Taliban-led insurgency can largely be attributed to the inadequate post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan by the international community. The failure of reconstruction efforts in bringing peace and stability to the country, and in creating much needed economic opportunities for the Afghan people made it possible for the Taliban to capitalize on Afghan people's resentment with reconstruction efforts, which enabled them to raise material and human resources for their cause.

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Making it up as we go along: state-building, critical theory and military adaptation in Afghanistan

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

The UN and Afghanistan: Contentions in Democratization and Statebuilding

The UN and Afghanistan: Contentions in Democratization and Statebuilding

Nexuses of knowledge and power in Afghanistan: the rise and fall of the informal justice assemblage

Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan : the role of post-conflict reconstruction

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