Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy

Farrell, Henry; Newman, Abraham L.

doi:10.1080/09692291003723672

Cited by 126 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 101 publications

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“…As the following contributions demonstrate, regulation of economic activity is today much more internationally intertwined and can no longer be neatly separated into national governance and trade relations. Instead, much regulation has become transnational and the majority of international negotiations today revolve around 'beyond the border' issues (Drezner 2007;Farrell and Newman 2010).…”

Section: Varieties Of Economic Liberalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic patriotism: reinventing control over open markets

Clift¹,

Woll²

2012

Journal of European Public Policy

172

110

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We analyse how tensions between international market integration and spatially limited political mandates have led to the phenomenon of economic patriotism. As discrimination in favour of insiders, economic patriotism goes beyond economic nationalism and can include territorial allegiances at the supranational or the local level. We show how this prism helps to understand the evolution of political intervention in open economies and present the ambition of this collection.

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Section: Varieties Of Economic Liberalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic patriotism: reinventing control over open markets

Clift¹,

Woll²

2012

Journal of European Public Policy

172

110

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The regulation of such 'international markets' that sit at 'the nexus between national and international affairs' (Farrell and Newman, 2010: 630, see also Mosley, 2010;critical Drezner, 2010) are heavily influenced by how other nations regulate them. National decisions in the absence of international agreements are often characterized by concerns over an even playing field for domestic actors and regulatory competition where domestic agencies are removing regulatory restrictions or oversight in order to permit domestic market players to gain a greater market share (Underhill, 1997a: 6).…”

Section: Cognitive Capture and Structural Constraints Of Regulatorsmentioning

confidence: 98%

In the Shadow of Basel: How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis

Thiemann

2014

Review of International Political Economy

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What if global governance mechanisms undermine the capacity of national banking regulators to deal with the deviant activities of their banks? Such was the case, this paper argues with respect to the Basel Accords and the regulation of the bank-based shadow-banking system. Securitizationactivities by banks, driven by regulatory arbitrage have been an integral part of the shadow banking sector and a central transmission mechanism during the financial crisis. They have been identified as problematic by the international regulatory community since 1999, motivating reforms in Basel 2. This paper investigates why, nevertheless, regulatory loopholes that allowed banks to engage in these activities without core capital charges persisted in almost all Western jurisdictions pre-crisis. It lays emphasis on the global nature of the securitization business in conjunction with its national regulation, and shows that these national regulations on the fringes of global banking regulation were driven by competitiveness concerns. The Basel Accords were central in this dynamic, as they guaranteed the global nature of this market and gave national banking regulators the leeway to exempt securitization-activities from global regulation. Rather than eliminating competitive inequity concerns, the Basel Accords channelled them to its fringes, where they introduced a regulatory race to the bottom.

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“…Looking at the recent history of the Chinese party-state in rebuilding its financial services sector, this link between global crises and institutional innovation deserves further study. While earlier works have emphasized the significance of the party-state in the politics of regulatory reform in China's financial services sector, we propose a slightly different perspective: in the tradition of an actor-centred historical institutionalism (Farrell & Newman 2010;Mayntz 2012;Mayntz & Scharpf 1996) we analyze the changes in China's banking sector as politics of regulation resulting from a political and entrepreneurial reaction to changes in the political and business environment at the national, local, and global level.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on China's Banking Sector

Haasbroek¹,

Gottwald²

2017

cjas

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The banking sector had long been left at the fringes of China's reform policies. Major initiatives of the 1990 and early 2000s helped to balance the need for modernization and internationalization with the objective of preserving political control. When the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) erupted in 2007, it hit the Chinese economy but predominantly in its export sector and much less in its financial sector. Yet when exports collapsed and factories closed in the winter of 2008/2009, the Chinese leadership implemented an ambitious stimulus program and used its leverage over the financial sector to re-start economic growth. These factors -GFC and domestic stimulus -created a series of intended and unintended outcomes. Financial reform in China entered a new stage signalling a profound change in China's banking sector. These changes follow two sometimes contradictive, sometimes mutually reinforcing reform dynamics of top-down policies and bottom-up innovation. In this article we follow an institutional approach and discuss the intensified participation of China's big banks in the Go Out strategy, followed by a shift in the pattern of lending. One factor in this change is the rise of shadow banking and particularly an explosive growth in internet-based financial services. Thus, while the initial reaction to the GFC re-emphasized direct, top-down state involvement in the banking sector, the outcomes of the GFC, China's policies and business innovations have facilitated profound bottom-up changes.

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Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy

Cited by 126 publications

References 101 publications

Economic patriotism: reinventing control over open markets

Economic patriotism: reinventing control over open markets

In the Shadow of Basel: How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis

The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on China's Banking Sector

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