Making Capability Lists: Philosophy versus Democracy

Abstract

The article discusses a fundamental problem that has to be faced if the general capability approach is to be developed in the direction of a theory of justice: the selection and justification of a list of capabilities. The democratic solution to this problem (defended by Amartya Sen) is to leave the selection of capabilities to a process of democratic deliberation, while the philosophical solution (defended by Martha Nussbaum) is to establish this list of capabilities as a matter of philosophical theory. The article investigates the debate between these two different positions and argues in favour of the philosophical solution. First, it distinguishes political from epistemological reasons for (not) making capability lists. Second, it shows that the democratic position must incorporate at least some philosophical theorising in general and a theory of democracy in particular. Third, the article argues that the democratic position presupposes that the philosophical position will bypass the democratic process while actually it does not. The philosophical position is actually more respectful of democracy than the democratic position. Fourth, while philosophers may exercise caution and connect their capability lists to actual democratic debates and other empirical sources, this kind of epistemological virtue ironically may heighten the chance of receiving reproaches on the political level.

Strong sustainability, critical natural capital and the capability approach

“…Her list includes ten central capabilities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play and control over one's environment (Nussbaum, 2000(Nussbaum, , 2003, see Appendix 1 for an overview of Nussbaum's list). Sen's objection to Nussbaum's position is that a philosophically based capability list is illegitimate because such lists should be the outcome of a public deliberation process (Claassen, 2011). However, Nussbaum does not rank the capabilities on her list and the value placed on capabilities may differ according to the context.…”

The Capability to Hold Property

“…This is important for those who may worry that the justification of private property should be left to different cultures to decide. I share Nussbaum's general point that philosophers may construct arguments for a list of universally valid basic capabilities (Claassen 2011). In this paper I have argued that the links between agency and property are sufficiently strong to defend an individual's right to hold private property on such a list of basic capabilities.…”

An Agency‐Based Capability Theory of Justice

“…My discussion here about the status of the list (transhistorical versus historically relative) is not to be conflated with the issue of its legitimate authors. On the latter issue, I cannot see what is wrong with granting philosophers (as anyone else) the opportunity to propose capability lists, nor why that would be disrespectful of democracy (Claassen ). That however is a different matter.…”

“…Apart from general criticisms about the adequacy of Rawlsian political liberalism for theorizing social justice, the main problem in the capability context is that it does not seem to make Nussbaum's substantive capability list any less perfectionist. This perfectionism problem should not be confused with the paternalism problem: for the difference between both, see Claassen (2014). 3 For examples of objective list theories, see Alkire (2002) and Qizilbash (1998).…”