Making Boundaries Great Again: Essentialism and Support for Boundary-Enhancing Initiatives

Abstract

Psychological essentialism entails a focus on category boundaries (e.g., categorizing people as men or women) and an increase in the conceptual distance between those boundaries (e.g., accentuating the differences between men and women). Across eight studies, we demonstrate that essentialism additionally entails an increase in support for boundary-enhancing legislation, policies, and social services, and that it does so under conditions that disadvantage social groups, as well as conditions that benefit them. First, individual differences in essentialism were associated with support for legislation mandating that transgender people use restrooms corresponding with their biological sex, and with support for the boundary-enhancing policies of the 2016 then-presumptive Republican presidential nominee (i.e., Donald Trump). Second, essentialism was associated with support for same-gender classrooms designed to promote student learning, as well as support for services designed to benefit LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer) individuals. These findings demonstrate the boundary-enhancing implications of essentialism and their social significance.

Are humans born to hate? Three myths and three developmental lessons about the origins of social categorization and inter-group bias

“…It is easy to see why such a view of the social world would be problematic and contribute to prejudice and other forms of inter-group bias. For example, an essentialist view of gender implies that it is impossible for one's gender to change over time and is associated with decreased acceptance of transgender identities and policies that support transgender rights and freedoms (Roberts, Ho, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2017).…”

An integrative review of impression formation processes for multiracial individuals

“…Initial research suggests that individuals' beliefs are associated with use of the Multiracial category, though more research along these lines is needed. For instance, participants primed with information that legitimized the existing monoracial categorization system made fewer Multiracial categorizations compared to a control condition (Chen & Hamilton, 2012), suggesting that individuals who place importance on traditional monoracial categories, such as those who endorse psychological essentialism (Haslam & Whelan, 2008;Roberts, Ho, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2017), would be less likely to adopt a Multiracial category (see also Chao, Hong, & Chiu, 2013). Domain-general belief systems that place importance on preserving traditional social structures (e.g., social dominance orientation; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) may also predict less use of the Multiracial category.…”

Value-based Essentialism: Essentialist Beliefs About Social Groups With Shared Values

“…The present studies found evidence for values as a pathway to essentialist beliefs about social groups. Value-based essentialism is a significant extension of previous research on essentialism and social groups, which has predominately emphasized internal biology both conceptually in theory and definitions (e.g., Atran, 1998;Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011;Keller, 2005) and methodologically in manipulations and measures (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006;Boysen, 2011;Brescoll & Lafrance, 2004;Ho et al, 2015;Kraus & Keltner, 2013;Rhodes et al, 2012;Roberts et al, 2017;Williams & Eberhardt, 2008).…”

“…For instance, essentialism promotes inductive generalizations-generalizing from one example to the category as a whole is sometimes called stereotyping when applied to social groups (Paolini & McIntyre, 2019;Sherman, 1996). Essentialism thus influences intergroup relations, promoting group-based stereotyping (Bastian & Haslam, 2006;Prentice & Miller, 2006;Yzerbyt et al, 1997;, intergroup prejudices (Haslam et al, 2002;Keller, 2005), and unfair allocation of resources (Rhodes et al, 2018), as well as accentuating perceived differences among social groups (Chao et al, 2013;Ho et al, 2015;Martin & Parker, 1995;Roberts et al, 2017). Essences also have consequences for how people reason about moral offenders and mental illness.…”