Maintaining peace across ethnic lines: New lessons from the past

Abstract

This policy overview draws upon two studies, one theoretical and one empirical, to explore lessons from medieval Indian Ocean trade for supporting ethnic tolerance in contemporary settings. The overview begins by sketching a model of inter-ethnic trade and violence in environments where there are 'local' and 'non-local' ethnic groups. The model suggests that three conditions are necessary to support peaceful coexistence between these groups over time: Complementarities between groups, a high cost to replicate or expropriate the source of another group's complementarity, and a mechanism to share the gains from inter-group exchange. The article then describes how these conditions were satisfied among Hindu and Muslim traders in medieval Indian ports from the rise of Islam to European ascendance in the 17th century. The article characterizes the institutions that emerged to bolster religious tolerance in these towns during the medieval period and that continued to support religious tolerance two centuries after the decline of Muslim dominance in overseas trade. Finally, the article draws lessons from the theory and India's institutional legacy to understand why ethnic tolerance fails and how tolerance may be fostered in contemporary settings.

Trade, Institutions, and Ethnic Tolerance: Evidence from South Asia

“…For example, the Baron de Montesquieu (1748) [Book XX,p. 1 Yet, from the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia to South Asians in East Africa to Jews in Europe, historical and contemporary examples abound of even the most commercially oriented minority groups becoming repeated targets of ethnic violence and expropriation (Benbassa and Rodrigue 2000;Chua 2003;Jha 2007;Landa 1994). 1 Yet, from the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia to South Asians in East Africa to Jews in Europe, historical and contemporary examples abound of even the most commercially oriented minority groups becoming repeated targets of ethnic violence and expropriation (Benbassa and Rodrigue 2000;Chua 2003;Jha 2007;Landa 1994).…”

Explaining inter-ethnic harmony in Enugu city, South-eastern Nigeria, 1970–2003

“…This position is further buttressed by Barth's (1968) observation, that plural societies are most stable and enduring when the ethnic groups existing in them occupy different ecological niches, in other words, are making their living in different ways and are not competing. Jha's (2007) perspective on economic 'complementarity' between 'locals' and 'non-locals' further supports this argument. As Jha (2007:3-4) puts it, when ethnic groups provide complementary goods or services to one another (rather than competition between the groups), the incentive for aggression against non-locals diminishes.…”

Asr Forum: Engaging With African Informal Economies

“…A final observation is that formal linkages with the state, exemplified by taxation and support for informal associations, appear to exacerbate rather than to mitigate conflict in the Nigerian context. While Armakolas (2011) draws attention to the role of the state in shoring up inter-religious relations in civil society, and Jha (2007) emphasizes the integrative importance of redistributive taxation, this northern Nigerian case shows that the state at all levels can also erode inter-religious solidarity through inequitable taxation and a failure to rein in divisive public behaviour. The evidence presented here shows that taxing the informal economy in divided societies can intensify conflict; in Kano, those who pay the most tax have the least political voice, owing to levers of public accountability based more on identity than on fiscal relations.…”

“…In fragile state environments where formal economies are weak, informal markets are said to foster interdependence among divided communities, and give rise to common interests in peace and stability that override incentives for conflict. Drawing lessons from Indian economic history, Saumitra Jha (2007) shows that religiously specialized trading networks were able to create a framework for peaceful relations in a society that had suffered from religious conflict in the past. 'In medieval Indian ports, Hindus and Muslims developed institutions that continue to support ethnic tolerance today.... methods that have been employed in medieval ports include the encouragement of specialization within groups, the fostering of opportunities for repeated interaction in both economic and noneconomic spheres, and the creation of institutionalized mechanisms to allow the sharing of gains from trade' (Jha 2007:8).…”