Mainstream Voters, Non-Voters and Populist Voters: What Sets Them Apart?

Abstract

Three different constituencies are becoming increasingly common across Western European electorates: mainstream voters, non-voters and populist voters. Despite their distinct behaviours in electoral politics, we have limited empirical knowledge about the characteristics that distinguish these three groups, given the typical underrepresentation of non-voters in surveys and the relative recency of large-scale research on populist voters. To address this gap, we analyse novel survey data from contemporary Germany that oversamples non-voters and includes a sizeable share of both populist radical left and populist radical right party supporters. Two main findings with broader implications stand out. First, populist voters resemble their mainstream counterparts in their expectations about democracy but correspond more closely to non-voters regarding (dis-)satisfaction with democracy. Second, non-voters and populist voters seem to reject mainstream democratic politics in distinct ways, throwing doubt on the (further) mobilization potential of abstainers for populist projects.

Just a “Mouthpiece of Biased Elites?” Populist Party Sympathizers and Trust in Czech Public Service Media

“…For the level of socioeconomic status, populist party sympathizers less often agree that the income of their household covers all of their needs. These differences are in line with studies that have described the differences between populist party voters and the voters of other parties (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Koch et al 2021; Spruyt et al 2016).…”

European by action: How voting reshapes nested identities

“…Therefore, even Brexit has not generated a situation in which voters on either side feel pressured to decide between European and British identities. Of course, non-voters differ from voters (Koch et al, 2021). I have conducted additional analyses in the Online appendix, showing robustness checks using Coarsened Exact Matching.…”

Populist disruption and the fourth age of political communication

“…By highlighting the discrepancies of the institutional and grassroots levels of political communication, populist disruption enhances the lopsided efficacy of the fourth age that Blumler described. Its narrative feeds into a climate of declining citizen engagement in institutional politics and a withdrawal from each other of citizens and politicians (Koch et al, 2021: 3). The disruptive logic of populist pragmatics exposes, dissects and thereby reshapes the media logic that pervades mainstream political communication.…”