Macro shocks and costly political action in non-democracies

Dorsch, Michael; Dunz, Karl; Maarek, Paul

doi:10.1007/s11127-015-0239-x

Cited by 17 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Second, our model introduces asymmetric information concerning the growth potential of the economy in a laissez-faire environment. Given our focus, the nature of the shock that can trigger political transition is quite different than in the previous literature that has generally considered macro-economic shocks that affect the cost of revolting in terms of foregone alternative opportunities (see Dorsch et al, 2012 for an exception). Rather, our model considers shocks that inform the workers' beliefs about whether growth potential exists in the economy, but has been suppressed by the elite's institutional choice, and that a transition to a laissez-faire economic institution will be worth the costly revolution necessary to achieve it.…”

Section: Discussion Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 In their very careful study of the "third wave" of democratization (from 1980-2000), Haggard and Kaufman (2012) find "surprisingly limited evidence in support of the general claim that redistributive conflicts between elites and masses account for either transitions to democracy or reversions from it". Dorsch et al (2012) provide empirical evidence over a longer panel of autocratic countries that political conflict may be driven by institutional grievances. Importantly, we assume that lasting deregulation destroys rents and is efficiency enhancing à la Aidt and Hillman (2008).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Inefficient predation and political transitions

Dorsch¹,

Maarek

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

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Section: Discussion Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Inefficient predation and political transitions

Dorsch¹,

Maarek

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…Other channels through which corruption reduces growth are the negative effects on human capital and private investment. In a recent study, Dorsch et al (2015) show that corruption (in the form of rent seeking) triggers instability effects of macro-economic shocks in autocracies.…”

Section: -Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and political stability: Does the youth bulge matter?

Farzanegan

Witthuhn

2017

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…(), and Dorsch et al . () also present empirical evidence in favor of a negative income shock as a trigger for changes toward democracy (see also sections 5 and 6).…”

Section: Empirical Research On Income and Democracymentioning

confidence: 68%

Jumps into Democracy: Integrating the Short and Long Run in the Democratic Transition

Paldam¹,

Gundlach²

2018

Kyklos

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Summary When countries become wealthy, they become democracies. Using kernel regressions, we show that the long‐run path in the Polity index looks exactly like a transition curve. However, the literature lacks a short‐run model that can generate this path. We note that the main political regime index is constant for most years. However, the stability is interrupted by infrequent jumps that are often quite large. We argue that periods of constancy represent political status quo equilibria that need to be broken by a triggering event. We find that such events occur randomly; they cannot be explained by economic variables. But if an event causes a change in the regime, the jump is normally in the direction of the transition curve. Hence, the curve acts as an attractor for the jumps. This is a new finding that integrates the short and the long run of the Democratic Transition.

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Macro shocks and costly political action in non-democracies

Cited by 17 publications

References 32 publications

Inefficient predation and political transitions

Inefficient predation and political transitions

Corruption and political stability: Does the youth bulge matter?

Jumps into Democracy: Integrating the Short and Long Run in the Democratic Transition

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