Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

“Never a Dull Moment”: The Moscow Ambassadorship of Sir Frank Roberts in the Years of the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, 1960–1962

“…69 Alongside ambassadors Ormsby-Gore in Washington and Herbert Marchant in Havana, Roberts helped to complete the picture. Some British officials learned of the American discovery of nuclear missiles in Cuba while attending an intelligence meeting at CIA headquarters on 19 October, 70 so it is likely that Roberts had at least some advance notice before the President's public announcement on Monday 22 October that the United States was imposing a naval blockade around Cuba. News that the Soviet Union had turned the island into a nuclear base took him by surprise.…”

“…The latter was deeply conscious of Moscow's duplicity and thought that Soviet encouragement to mediate was intended to 'test our resolve and lay a bait to our vanity'. 91 This view probably derived, at least in part, to the cautious counsel of Roberts, for whom Douglas-Home had particular respect because of Roberts' lengthy experience as a diplomat. 92 A paucity of Soviet sources means that it is impossible to provide a definitive verdict about Ivanov's intentions, but Len Scott has suggested that he was probably 'engaged on a mission from Moscow' rather than operating independently.…”

“…The secondary aim, however, was 'most certainly disinformation concerning Soviet nuclear forces in Cuba'. 93 While much of the world feared impending doom, Roberts emphasised that there was no missile crisis among most Muscovites. Life continued in a calm and orderly manner for the general public, and Soviet officials remained amenable.…”

The Menzies Government, the American Alliance and the Cuban Missile Crisis

“…Indeed, the London Daily Telegraph had cabled the Australian Department of Prime Minister on 24 October querying whether it was aware of the crisis on 19 October 63 -the same date the UK was informed. 64 Bunting asked Allan T. Griffith, his principal advisor on foreign affairs and defence, what was behind the query. 65 Griffith suspected the newspaper was "sniffing for a 'lack of consultation' story".…”

Britain and the Missile Gap: British Estimates on the Soviet Ballistic Missile Threat, 1957–61

“…He supplied classified Soviet documents, mainly from the General Staff files and intelligence and gossip on the thinking inside the Soviet hierarchy. 30 Penkovsky's intelligence was not comprehensive and could not wholly eliminate ambiguity, indeed questions remain over the relative value of his reports compared to satellite and telemetry intelligence. 31 Such was the situation then at the outset of the estimating process: the British and American intelligence communities were extremely close, both in terms of sharing sources and of running joint operations, but they faced three problems.…”