Macintrye, Moral Value, and Mahayana Buddhism: Embracing the Unthinkable in Moral Education

Emotional Intelligence Meets Virtue Ethics: Implications for Educators

“…That is, MacIntyre's (1984) concept of telos is grounded in a tradition of faith (Vokey, 2001); therefore, one would only need to know the telos of one's faith that provides the motivation to pursue a virtuous path. In contrast, Vokey (2005) proposed that people commonly rely on human experience to determine intrinsic value. This ability can be developed in the individual to provide a cognitional capability to apprehend one's telos and the intrinsic good.…”

“…Goleman et al (2002) do not articulate clearly how this deep introspection can be done to reveal one's personal ideal. Vokey (2005) addressed the limitations in MacIntyre's (1984MacIntyre's ( , 1988 proposals through reference to Mahayana Buddhist traditions, which may provide some clarity to Goleman's et al (2002) process. Vokey (2005) proposed that moral education would benefit from an appeal to "reasons of the heart" (Vokey 2001, pp.…”

“…This cognitive-affective response is evident when people are "profoundly moved in positive ways by experiencing or witnessing freedom, solidarity and compassion; and profoundly moved in negative ways by experiencing or witnessing oppression, alienation, and indifference" (Vokey, 2005, p. 95). Moreover, Vokey suggested that MacIntyre's (1984MacIntyre's ( , 1988 moral philosophy is limited in that it emphasizes discursive, propositional knowledge at the expense of practical personal knowledge (Vokey, 2005) and in that it relies on moral theory grounded in a specific faith to justify why virtues should be intrinsically valued (Vokey, 2001). Consistent with this view Vokey (2001) holds that MacIntyre's (1984MacIntyre's ( , 1988 philosophy has not considered the role of non-conceptual insight to determine intrinsic value; and with respect to telos, it has relegated the quality of human experience to a motivating role as opposed to a cognitional role.…”

“…It is at this point that we wish to turn to Vokey (2001) for a critique of MacIntyre's (1984MacIntyre's ( , 1988 position and a resolution to his concerns, which will give us a way to use the basic insight gained from MacIntyre about the relational and communal nature of the development of virtue to fortify the Goleman et al (2002) EI proposal. Vokey (2005) argued it is important that people learn to recognize what a truly virtuous person, who acts based on intrinsic moral values, would do in particular contexts. He holds that MacIntyre's (1999, MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) framework for moral education does not achieve this recognition because it relies soley on a discursive and intellectual approach whereas intrinsic value requires both an intellectual understanding and an embodied emotional understanding which are known as "reasons of the heart" (Vokey, 2001, pp.…”

“…257-309). Intrinsic value is defined as an event or object judged to be intrinsically good for its own sake as opposed to for the sake of human desires or interests (Vokey, 2005).…”