Machine tools and mass production in the armaments boom: Germany and the United States, 1929–44

Abstract

This article anatomizes the ‘productivity race’ between Nazi Germany and the US over the period from the Great Depression to the Second World War in the metalworking industry. We present novel data that allow us to account for both the quantity of installed machine tools and their technological type. Hitherto, comparison of productive technologies has been limited to case studies and well‐worn narratives about US mass production and European‐style flexible specialization. Our data show that the two countries in fact employed similar types of machines combined in different ratios. Furthermore, neither country was locked in a rigid technological paradigm. By 1945 Germany had converged on the US both in terms of capital‐intensity and the specific technologies employed. Capital investment made a greater contribution to output growth in Germany, whereas US growth was capital‐saving. Total factor productivity growth made a substantial contribution to the armaments boom in both countries. But it was US industry, spared the war's most disruptive effects, that was in a position to take fullest advantage of the opportunities for wartime productivity growth. This adds a new element to familiar explanations for Germany's rapid catch‐up after 1945.

Productivity Trends in Advanced Countries between 1890 and 2012

“…A downward break is indeed identified at the beginning of the 1930s for the euro area and the United Kingdom in their productivity trend relative to the United States (Figure ). In Germany, labor productivity and total factor productivity were relatively dynamic during this interwar sub‐period, with a convergence to the U.S. level not completely achieved for labor productivity but over‐achieved for TFP during the Nazi period, due to the adoption of very high performance productive technologies (Ristuccia and Tooze, ). The productivity gap remained largely constant with respect to that of Japan during the interwar years, while it increased with the United Kingdom as barriers to competition allowed high‐cost producers to remain in business (Broadberry and Crafts, ).…”

The Yankees of Europe? A New View on Technology and Productivity in German Manufacturing in the Early Twentieth Century

“…But it will lay a foundation for further long-term growth. Indeed, Ristuccia and Tooze (2013) suggest that the process of capital deepening in the machine tool industry in the 1930s helped in laying the foundations for the postwar growth miracle.…”

“…Richter (2008) concludes that not only thousands of American machine tools were in use in Germany, but also the same amount or even more German copies of these tools. In a more recent article, Cristiano Ristuccia and Adam Tooze (2013) analyze the number of purchased machines in Germany and the United States and found clear convergence such that by the 1930s both countries operated very similar machine-worker ratios. Moreover, they find that German additions to the machinery stock consisted of new technologies not unlike those in America.…”

“…Apart from a new coat of paint, this was often installed in its original form. A particular striking example is the German machine-tool industry (Ristuccia and Tooze 2013). By the late 1930s the number of advanced machines per worker installed on the factory floor was comparable between the United States and Germany.…”

The Sources of Growth in a Technologically Progressive Economy: The United States, 1899–1941

“…There was considerable exchange of technological know-how between the US and Western Europe, particularly following the First World War. German and British entrepreneurs traveled to the US to study American organization first hand, aiming to incorporate American machinery and management techniques in their production lines (Braun 1984;Nolan, 1994, Bowden andHiggins, 2004;Eichengreen, 2004;Richter and Streb, 2011;Ristuccia and Tooze, 2013). At the same time, the US frequently imported technology from across the Atlantic.…”