Lying, more or less: a computer simulation study of graded lies and trust dynamics

Abstract

Partial lying denotes the cases where we partially believe something to be false but nevertheless assert it with the intent to deceive the addressee. We investigate how the severity of partial lying may be determined and how partial lies can be classified. We also study how much epistemic damage an agent suffers depending on the level of trust that she invests in the liar and the severity of the lies she is told. Our analysis is based on the results from exploratory computer simulations of an arguably rational Bayesian agent who is trying to determine how biased a coin is while observing the coin tosses and listening to a (partial) liar's misleading predictions about the outcomes. Our results provide an interesting testable hypothesis at the intersection of epistemology and ethics, namely that in the longer term partial lies lead to more epistemic damage than outright lies.If falsehood had, like truth, but one face only, we should be upon better terms; for we should then take for certain the contrary to what the liar says: but the reverse of truth has a hundred thousand forms, and a field indefinite, without bound or limit (Montaigne).

Group Assertions and Group Lies

“…To illustrate: suppose that you're somewhat confident that Carolina went to the gym today, but (given your uncertainty) you don't quite believe that she did. You would be lying if you told someone that Carolina didn't go to the gym, even if you don't outright believe that what you said is false (there is consensus on this; see Isenberg 1964;Carson 2006;Whyte 2013, Marsili 2014, 2021a, Marsili and Löhr forthcoming, Krauss 2017, Benton 2018, Trpin et al 2021. I call this kind of lie a "graded-belief" lie.…”

Lying: Knowledge or belief?

“…But is outright belief required for lying? It has been argued that this requirement would be too strong (Carson 2006(Carson , 2010Whyte 2013;Marsili 2014Marsili , 2018aMarsili , 2019Krauss 2017;Trpin, Dobrosovestnova, and Sebastian 2020;cf. Isenberg 1964;Benton 2018).…”