Luminosity Guaranteed

Abstract

This article aims to show that Williamson's anti‐luminosity argument does not succeed if we presuppose a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic. In contrast to other luminists, however, my strategy is not to critically focus on the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence that anti‐luminists typically use in this context. Instead, I will argue that, given a certain conception of what Chalmers calls ‘direct phenomenal concepts,’ luminosity is guaranteed even if the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence is taken for granted.

Some Problems with the Anti‐Luminosity‐Argument

“…Those who still wish to defend luminosity do so in ways that are orthogonal to it. One prominent such strategy is to invoke the Chalmers (2003) notion of ‘direct phenomenal concepts’ (Barz 2017) (Duncan 2018). Jenkins (2018) accepts the ALA but argues that luminosity still obtains for certain mental processes and events (rather than mental conditions).…”