Luck and the Limits of Equality

Jeffers, Matthew T.

doi:10.1080/05568641.2020.1762114

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Here, again, it is maintained that her failure to act prudently means she is responsible for this personal cost and is to be denied compensation as a penalty. 7 For a recent paper that attempts to extend the boring problem into a more general objection to theories that declare luck-based inequality unjust, see Jeffers (2020).…”

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confidence: 99%

Luck egalitarianism without moral tyranny

Spafford

2021

Philos Stud

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Luck egalitarians contend that, while each person starts out with a claim to an equal quantity of advantage, she can forfeit this claim by making certain choices. The appeal of luck egalitarianism is that it seems to satisfy what this paper calls the moral tyranny constraint. According to this constraint, any acceptable theory of justice must preclude the possibility of an agent unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leaving others with less advantage under conditions of full compliance with the theory. This paper argues that claim forfeiture is built into luck egalitarianism specifically to preclude such moral tyranny. However, it contends that the dominant interpretation of luck egalitarianism fails to fully satisfy the moral tyranny constraint. It offers an alternative interpretation that both eliminates the possibility of moral tyranny and rescues the position from two other prominent objections that have been directed against luck egalitarianism.

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confidence: 99%