Low level noble gas measurements in the field and laboratory in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Stocki, T. J.; Bean, Marc; Ungar, R. Kurt; Toivonen, H.; Zhang, Weihua; Whyte, Jeff; Meyerhof, Dorothy

doi:10.1016/j.apradiso.2004.03.051

Cited by 27 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The goal for the MDC set by CTBTO guidelines is 1 mBq/m 3 for 133 Xe. SPALAX data analyzed with Aatami achieved an MDC of 0.9 mBq/m 3 for 133m Xe and 0.7 mBq/m 3 for 131m Xe (STOCKI et al, 2004). For 135 Xe, an MDC of 0.4 mBq/m 3 can be achieved and 0.2 mBq/m 3 for 133 Xe.…”

Section: Detection Limit To Substitute Missing Concentration Measuremmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…These are the Système de Prélèvement d'Air Automatique en Ligne avec l'Analyse des radioXénons atmosphériques (SPALAX) from the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), France , and the Swedish Automatic Unit for Noble Gas Acquisition (SAUNA) developed by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Sweden (RINGBOM et al, 2003). SPALAX measurements have collection times of 24 h and were taken at Ottawa and at Yellowknife, both in Canada (STOCKI et al, 2004(STOCKI et al, , 2005. Other sets of SPALAX data have been taken on Schauinsland, a mountain in nearby Freiburg , Germany, as well as at Bruyères-le-Châtel, France.…”

Section: Observations Of Atmospheric Xenonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even in sensitivity measurements of atmospheric xenon activity concentrations in ground level air (AUER et al, 2004;SAEY and DE GEER, 2005;STOCKI et al, 2004), the instrumentation used cannot always detect all of the xenon isotopes because two or more of them are at very low concentrations and thus below the detection limits. Therefore, a robust screening method using xenon ratios should be able to handle the circumstances in which only 2 or 3 of the isotopes are measured, and the others are presumed to be either at or below the detection limit.…”

Section: Detection Limit To Substitute Missing Concentration Measuremmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Discrimination of Nuclear Explosions against Civilian Sources Based on Atmospheric Xenon Isotopic Activity Ratios

Kalinowski

Axelsson

Bean³

et al. 2010

Pure Appl. Geophys.

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144

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A global monitoring system for atmospheric xenon radioactivity is being established as part of the International Monitoring System that will verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) once the treaty has entered into force. This paper studies isotopic activity ratios to support the interpretation of observed atmospheric concentrations of (135)Xe, (133m)Xe, (133)Xe and (131m)Xe. The goal is to distinguish nuclear explosion sources from civilian releases. Simulations of nuclear explosions and reactors, empirical data for both test and reactor releases as well as observations by measurement stations of the International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE) are used to provide a proof of concept for the isotopic ratio based method for source discrimination

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Section: Detection Limit To Substitute Missing Concentration Measuremmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Observations Of Atmospheric Xenonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Detection Limit To Substitute Missing Concentration Measuremmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Discrimination of Nuclear Explosions against Civilian Sources Based on Atmospheric Xenon Isotopic Activity Ratios

Kalinowski

Axelsson

Bean³

et al. 2010

Pure Appl. Geophys.

Self Cite

144

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Minimum detectable activity concentration well below the CTBT specification of 1 mBq m ÿ3 has been achieved for 133 Xe. Better sensitivity can be obtained depending on the background, the exact setting of the detection system, and the mode of data analysis (g alone or coupling of g and X-ray energy bands) (see Stocki et al, 2004).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automated radioxenon monitoring for the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in two distinctive locations: Ottawa and Tahiti

Stocki¹,

Blanchard

D’Amours

et al. 2005

Journal of Environmental Radioactivity

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“…If the activity concentration in the sample measured with a g detector is high, the software used recognizes all the relevant gamma peaks and calculates the activity concentration. If, however, the activity of the meta-stable isotopes is very low, complex mathematics are used to deconvolve their Xray peaks at around 30 keV [15]. To be able to perform these ultra-low measurements, several calibrations have to be performed regularly for each detector: energy calibration, resolution calibration, efficiency calibration, total efficiency calibration, step ratio calibration, left and right tail calibration.…”

Section: O M P L E X I T Y 93mentioning

confidence: 99%

The complexity of CTBT verification. Taking noble gas monitoring as an example

Kalinowski

Becker²,

Saey³

et al. 2008

Complexity

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Verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a complex undertaking. A monitoring system comprising a global network of 321 seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations is used to detect signals that could indicate a possible nuclear explosion. This system daily sends more than 10 GB of raw data to the Vienna based International Data Centre for further processing and analysis to answer a simple question: have any indications for a possible nuclear explosion been sensed? We will focus on the 40 stations in charge for global radioxenon monitoring and discuss the complexity of solving the nuclear source attribution problem.2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 14: [89][90][91][92][93][94][95][96][97][98][99] 2008 INTRODUCTION T he verification of international agreements is often a highly complex undertaking. First of all, the cultural gap between scientific analysis and diplomatic thinking has to be bridged. Furthermore, even within the process of measurement, data processing, and analysis, many different methodologies are applied in an interdisciplinary cooperation.The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions. It has not yet entered into force, but its verification system is being established by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBTO PrepCom (CTBT Organisation Preparatory Commission) in Vienna. This verification system consists of three elements: global monitoring, consultation and clarification as well as on-site inspections. The main component is the International Monitoring System (IMS) that will be used to verify compliance with the CTBT once it has entered into force. This system will consist of 321 measurement stations all over the world (see Figure 1). Seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide sensors are used to detect signals that could indicate a possible nuclear explosion. Every day, more than 10 GigaByte of raw data will be transmitted through a Global Communication Infrastructure (GCI) system to the International Data Centre (IDC) of the PTS in Vienna. The GCI consists of a network of five satellites that links the data measured at IMS stations directly to Vienna, This is an invited paper for the Special Issue-Security and Complexity, Guest Editor: Jü rgen Scheffran. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission. where it is also controlled and managed. The task of the IDC is to process and analyze this huge amount of data in order to break this information down to a simple message: have any indications for a possible nuclear explosion been sensed? This is reported in a daily executive summary bulletin that refers to more elaborate lists and reports. The IDC reports do not contain any interpretation or prejudice. The final judgement is left to the states parties. The raw data and the reports are sent out to the customers, which are authorized users in the member states. National data centers (NDCs) make use of the reports a...

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Low level noble gas measurements in the field and laboratory in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Cited by 27 publications

References 6 publications

Discrimination of Nuclear Explosions against Civilian Sources Based on Atmospheric Xenon Isotopic Activity Ratios

Discrimination of Nuclear Explosions against Civilian Sources Based on Atmospheric Xenon Isotopic Activity Ratios

Automated radioxenon monitoring for the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in two distinctive locations: Ottawa and Tahiti

The complexity of CTBT verification. Taking noble gas monitoring as an example

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