Low-Cost Nuclear Arms Races

Abstract

Press suggested in Spring 2006 that the United States had achieved nuclear primacy over Russia and China. 1 The United States could conduct a nuclear first strike on either country and remain virtually unscathed in the aftermath, argued Lieber, an associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, and Press, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College. Their analysis met a great deal of skepticism within the international security community. U.S. and Soviet/Russian strategic calculations had indeed changed since the end of the Cold War, as had calculations between the United States and China, but most, if not all, observers believed both nations had sufficient nuclear forces to deter the United States. Despite this initial skepticism, the idea that the United States had gained a dominant strategic position over Russia and China lingered, raising the tantalizing question: What if Lieber and Press were right? How easily might Russia and China expand their nuclear arsenals and challenge U.S. superiority? And how should U.S. thinking on arms control and nonproliferation change as a consequence to avoid further destabilizing arms races? These concerns are vital. Since its post-Cold War decline, Russia has been making a bid to regain its global power and standing, and its recent military buildup includes new nuclear forces. Further to the east, China continues its rise to superpower status. While Chinese actions have remained relatively pacific in recent years, its economy financed yearly double-digit percent increases in its defense spending during the past decade. 2 And new nuclear arms races may not be limited to just the United States, China, and Russia. With the prospect of an Iranian nuclear capability looming on the horizon, a number of countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia,

First Missiles, then Nukes? Explaining the Connection between Missile Programs and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

“…6 See Lindley and Clemency (2009) for estimates of the percent of GDP required to produce the same number of nuclear weapons in different countries.…”