Low-cost distance-spoofing attack on FMCW radar and its feasibility study on countermeasure

Nashimoto, Shoei; Suzuki, Daisuke; Miura, Noriyuki; Machida, Tatsuya; Matsuda, Kohei; Nagata, Makoto

doi:10.1007/s13389-020-00252-5

Cited by 15 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Due to the fact that the mmWave radar is crucial in bad weather conditions, an attack to fool its measured distance is a critical physical security threat [7], [20]. Specifically, a distance-only spoofing attack [16], [18] was presented on a mmWave Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar. The system used a weak Arduino platform against an FMCW radar which used the less-common triangular waveform.…”

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike [16], [18], which focused on radars using a triangular chirp waveform, our system addresses the modern saw-tooth waveform (so called "fast chirps"), as this chirp waveform is frequently found in contemporary FMCW radars in the AV industry [14], [25]. And unlike [23], we only require a single rogue radar within a vehicle in front of the victim.…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The BlueFMCW for example is a novel frequency hoping radar, that uses frequency randomization in order to countermeasure attacks [17]. In [18], the authors also propose a random-chirp modulation based on randomization of frequency. Both mitigation systems require additional hardware in order to cope with the attack.…”

Section: Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors of [17], [18] provide only numeric simulation level results for the countermeasures, and still require further work on a real equipment in order to convince their effectiveness. Furthermore, even in nonadversarial environments, the large number of vehicles on the same road already leads to frequency spectrum density.…”

Section: Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spoofing Attacks Against Vehicular FMCW Radar

Komissarov¹,

Wool²

2021

Preprint

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The safety and security of the passengers in vehicles in the face of cyber attacks is a key element in the automotive industry, especially with the emergence of the Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and the vast improvement in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). Such platforms use various sensors, including cameras, LiDAR and mmWave radar. These sensors themselves may present a potential security hazard if exploited by an attacker.In this paper we propose a system to attack an automotive FMCW mmWave radar, that uses fast chirp modulation. Using a single rogue radar, our attack system is capable of spoofing the distance and velocity measured by the victim vehicle simultaneously, presenting phantom measurements coherent with the laws of physics governing vehicle motion. The attacking radar controls the delay in order to spoof its distance, and uses phase compensation and control in order to spoof its velocity. After developing the attack theory, we demonstrate the spoofing attack by building a proof-of-concept hardware-based system, using a Software Defined Radio. We successfully demonstrate two real world scenarios in which the victim radar is spoofed to detect either a phantom emergency stop or a phantom acceleration, while measuring coherent range and velocity. We also discuss several countermeasures to the attack, in order to propose ways to mitigate the described attack.

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Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spoofing Attacks Against Vehicular FMCW Radar

Komissarov¹,

Wool²

2021

Preprint

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“…Spoofing attacks can also be performed on other radar applications [ 38 , 39 , 40 ]. In particular, there is a growing interest in detecting unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) [ 41 ] and one of the detection techniques proposed is the use of FMCW radars, which are susceptible to suffer attacks [ 42 , 43 , 44 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spoofing Attacks on FMCW Radars with Low-Cost Backscatter Tags

Lázaro

Porcel

Lazaro

et al. 2022

Sensors

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This work studies the feasibility of using backscatter-modulated tags to introduce false information into a signal received by a frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW) radar. A proof-of-concept spoofing device was designed in the 24 GHz ISM band. The spoofing device was based on an amplifier connected between two antennas, and modulation was carried out by switching the amplifier bias. The use of an amplifier allowed us to increase the level of spoofing signal compared with other modulated backscattering methods. The simulated and experimental results show that our method has the ability to generate a pair of false targets at different ranges and velocities depending on the modulation frequency of the chosen tag, since sidebands appear due to this modulation. Countermeasures to detect the spoofing attack based on changes in the slope of the frequency sweep between frames are also proposed.

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