Cooperation can be difficult to sustain when there is temptation to free-ride on efforts of others. Punishment can stabilize cooperation, but it is usually costly to both the punisher and the punished. In addition, antisocial use of punishment -punishment of co-operators, counter-punishment and feuds -can reduce overall welfare. The current study investigated if powerful individuals -individuals who can punish more effectively or who are immune from punishment -police the antisocial use of punishment, thus reducing the welfare-harming consequences of punishment. To create ample opportunities for anti-social punishment, our modified Public Goods game implemented fixed groups, fixed participant identifiers, two punishment stages, and full information about participant actions. Participants who were immune or had lower punishment cost punished low contributors more often, and immune participants also punished those who punished co-operators. Intriguingly, we found that whenever all participants could punish each other -regardless of the cost of delivering punishment or asymmetry in the cost -cooperation and net earnings reached very high levels.However, participants who were immune from punishment cooperated at a markedly low level, reducing welfare in the group. The results show that in an environment with repeated interactions, plenty of information, and everyone being accountable, even inefficient punishment can maintain high cooperation and welfare