Los supuestos filosóficos en psicología del desarrollo: ¿Meta teoría o marco epistémico?

Abstract

Sostenemos la tesis de que un conjunto de presuposiciones básicas, ontológicas y epistemológicas subyace a las investigaciones en psicología del desarrollo, en términos de meta teorías (MT) y de marco epistémico (ME). Ello plantea algunos problemas, entre otros: ¿cómo se integran los presupuestos al proceso científico? ¿Cómo es afectado este último por las posiciones ontológicas y epistemológicas? ¿Subsisten inalterables los supuestos o estos pueden modificarse, durante las investigaciones? ¿En qué difieren y en qué son similares las dos versiones? Intentaremos ciertas respuestas. En primer lugar, caracterizamos a la categoría de MT propuesta por Overton, y ampliada por Witherington y otros autores. Luego, examinamos la de ME formulada por Piaget y García, revisitada por Becerra y Castorina, introduciendo a los valores ético-políticos y las regulaciones sociales. Más adelante, se analizan las semejanzas y las diferencias entre las MT, asociados con la noción de paradigma, y los ME con una fuerte impronta en los valores ético-político y las regulaciones sociales Finalmente, sugerimos los beneficios para los ME de incorporar los análisis conceptuales de las MT y para éstas últimas de introducir las condiciones sociales.

Integrating affection, emotion, and aesthetics into a General Theory of Learning

“…In all cases, emotions are understood as external and independent variables from the learning process (in the first two, emotions cause learning, in the third, learning causes emotions). This way of posing the question about the relationship between learning and emotions corresponds to the logic of “legitimate psychological explanation” (Brainerd, as cited in Castorina & Baquero, 2005, p. 240), which is clearly situated in the epistemic framework of the split (Castorina, 2010).…”

“…It could be argued that the andragogy approach is situated in a split epistemic framework that is incapable of explaining the processes of human development and learning (Castorina, 2006, 2009, 2010; Castorina & Baquero, 2005). An alternative to this issue could be the one proposed by Bourgeois and Nizet (1997/2007).…”

“…This synthesis critically develops Bourgeois and Nizet’s (1997/2007) neo-Piagetian proposal. It is explicitly situated in the relational–dialectical epistemic framework that, as Castorina (2010; Castorina & Baquero, 2005) states, is necessary to explain human learning.…”

“…The difficulty of understanding meaning-making besides mere association and the conflictive conception of the learning process in the different moments of the lifespan leaves the theory in a diffuse comprehension of the relationship between the subject and their environment for learning. In this sense, this associationist theory should be situated within the split epistemic framework (Castorina, 2010; Overton, 2010), which assumes that forces or factors external to the psychological organism (biological or environmental), and essentially different from it, mechanically causes change (development or learning). This kind of theory would not be able to explain properly the meaning-making process as a construction of an authentic novelty (Castorina, 2006, 2009).…”

“…In contrast with Mezirow (1991, 2009) and his followers’ transformative learning theory, in this article we have tried to conceptualize both affection and emotion, and learning from a dialectic–relational epistemic framework (Castorina, 2010), and with that, we propose a way of integrating them internally in such a way that they participate in the same process, as part of the experience of conflict and uncertainty for learning.…”