Lopsided lobbying? Regulatory opportunism and the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying

Abstract

This article traces the institutional trajectory of the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying (OCL). It is argued that political elites' electoral prioritization, foremost demonstrated within the Lobbying Act, has undermined the OCL in its mission toward a balanced and transparent lobbying system. Politicians have demonstrated a form of regulatory opportunism in which change is filtered by electoral calculations. Gaps in the Commissioner's authority, the registration floor, and the scope of communication reporting stand out as enabling features. The article's findings suggest greater attention should be devoted to monitoring the minutiae of regulations and the gravity of electoral calculations in regulatory reform.Sommaire : Cet article retrace le parcours institutionnel du Commissariat au lobbying (CAL). Nous soutenons que les priorités électorales des élites politiques, mises en évidence avant tout dans la Loi sur le lobbying, ont affaibli le CAL dans sa mission d'établir un système de lobbying équilibré et transparent. Les politiques ont fait preuve d'une forme d'opportunisme régulateur dans lequel le changement est filtré par des calculs électoraux. Les disparités dans l'autorité du commissaire, le plancher d'inscription et la portée des rapports de communication se distinguent comme des caractéristiques instrumentales. Les conclusions de l'article suggèrent que l'on devrait accorder une plus grande attention à la surveillance des menus détails des réglementations et à la gravité des calculs électoraux dans la réforme réglementaire.

How did the disclosure of lobbying targeting Quebec's hospitals become mandatory and with what effect?

“…The Quebec lobbying legislation is less stringent than the Canadian one (Chari et al, 2007), which has recently been described as limited (Fry, 2022). Quebec, too, is marked by a lack of political interest in fundamental reform.…”

“…An analysis of the chronology of events, as well as a content analysis of a parliamentary debate about this issue, unequivocally showed that this change was not the result of an attempt to respond to a scandal (Holman & Luneburg, 2012; Ozymy, 2010) or a desire for cross‐jurisdictional learning by the government (Crepaz, 2017; Pross & Shepherd, 2017). Nor does the change appear to have been driven by electoral calculations (i.e., the mechanism of regulatory opportunism) (Fry, 2022) since it occurred serendipitously more than a year after the provincial election and not due to an explicit electoral pledge. Indeed, these mechanisms do not seem to account for the action of political actors in the case under study.…”

“…The symbolic gain lies in the simple fact of having supported the change, whereas lobbying laws are often full of holes and exceptions, as is the case in Quebec (Yates, 2018). Another theory, also based on the image of the calculating politician, is the one centred on the mechanism known as regulatory opportunism, which has been used to explain changes in Canadian federal regulation (Fry, 2022). According to this explanation, regulatory changes are mediated by political actors’ electoral calculations.…”

“…Has this policy change resulted in greater lobbying transparency? The findings of this study are valuable for lobbying scholars and lawmakers because it expands the list of known change mechanisms such as scandals (Ozymy, 2010), cross‐jurisdictional learning (Crepaz, 2017; Pross & Shepherd, 2017) or regulatory opportunism for electoral purposes (Fry, 2022).…”

Canadian Crown corporations and social procurement: Trade commitments and institutional bricolage

“…1 1 The Canadian federal government tested its procurement agility during the pandemic. The We Charity scandal is an example of this challenge (see Fry, 2022). …”