Looks as Powers

Pettit, Philip

doi:10.1111/1533-6077.00013

Cited by 77 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(21 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Thus, the colour experiences of a subject adapting to Kohler's coloured goggles return to normal insofar as their abilities to sift, sort and track objects on the basis of perceptual sensitivity to colour-determining properties are brought back into line with the range of abilities they possessed before donning the goggles (Pettit 2003). Blindsight subjects retain abilities to perceptually discriminate between certain shades and shapes, but lack conscious experience of those shades and shapes since the discriminations and classifications enabled for them can only be put in touch with their current intentional goals and projects via the intermediary of a prompt from the experimenter.…”

Section: The Action-space Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Johnston 1992) identify colours with dispositions to produce certain visual experiences in certain perceivers. But we might also attempt to give a dispositional analysis of those experiences themselves, in terms of capacities for classification, discrimination and judgement with which they are associated (Shoemaker 1996;Pettit 2003). So, for Pettit (2003), for something to look a certain way with respect to colour is for it to empower certain abilities in the perceiver.…”

Section: Italics In Original)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But we might also attempt to give a dispositional analysis of those experiences themselves, in terms of capacities for classification, discrimination and judgement with which they are associated (Shoemaker 1996;Pettit 2003). So, for Pettit (2003), for something to look a certain way with respect to colour is for it to empower certain abilities in the perceiver. For example, a tomato's looking red to a perceiver is a matter of its empowering her to, among other things, sort it with red and other similarly-coloured objects, sift it from differently-coloured objects, and track it across a range of different backgrounds and perceptual situations.…”

Section: Italics In Original)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This opens up the possibility that the space of actions which an agent implicitly takes to be enabled can come apart from her explicit conceptual judgements about what actions her environment affords. This is how, when our informed perceiver experiences the grey dots at the intersections of the Hermann grid, she can implicitly take herself to be able to sift, sort, track and compare (see Pettit 2003) the dots in a certain way whilst explicitly judging that there are no objects present that are appropriate for such actions.…”

Section: Illusions Hallucinations and Sleepwalkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience

2010

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent's direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, but as a matrix of possibilities for pursuing and accomplishing one's intentional actions, goals and projects. If this is correct, the links between planning, intention and perceptual experience are tight, while (contrary to some recent accounts invoking the notion of 'sensorimotor expectations') the links between embodied activity and perceptual experience, though real, are indirect. What matters is not bodily activity itself, but our practical knowledge (which need not be verbalized or in any way explicit) of our own possibilities for action. Such knowledge, selected, shaped and filtered by the grid of plans, goals, and intentions, plays, we argue, a constitutive role in explaining the content and character of visual perceptual experience.

show abstract

Section: The Action-space Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Italics In Original)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Italics In Original)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Illusions Hallucinations and Sleepwalkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience

2010

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…One plausible strategy for avoiding this myth is to appeal to our capacities as agents. Perception can inform us because we can spontaneously and actively impose conceptual forms on perceptual sensations (Kant , Sellars , McDowell ), or because it puts us in a position to discriminate, classify, or otherwise act upon the world (Pettit , Matthen ), or because we understand our capacities to skilfully manipulate our ongoing sensory relationship to the world (Noë , ). Insofar as such strategies neglect to explain how active exercises of conceptual, classificatory or sensorimotor capacities have the particular contents that they do, they court Hurley's Myth of the Giving ; if we agree that our perceptual capacity to be given material for thought and experience by the world stands in need of explanation then it is unclear why this should not also be true of our practical capacity to give determinate content to our activities and practices .…”

Section: Enactivism Transparency and Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism

Ward

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The transparency of perceptual experience has been invoked in support of many views about perception. I argue that it supports a form of enactivism—the view that capacities for perceptual experience and for intentional agency are essentially interdependent. I clarify the perceptual phenomenon at issue, and argue that enactivists should expect to find a parallel instance of transparency in our agentive experience, and that the two forms of transparency are constitutively interdependent (Section 1). I then argue that i) we do indeed find such parallels: the way in which an action is directed towards its goal through our bodily movements parallels the way in which an experience is directed towards its object through our perceptual sensation (Section 2), and ii) reflecting on sensorimotor skills shows why the two instances of transparency are constitutively interdependent (Section 3). Section 4 gives reasons for generalizing beyond the cases considered so far by applying the enactive view to Kohler's landmark studies of perceptual adaptation. The final section clarifies the form of enactivism to which the previous sections point. The view that emerges is one whereby our perceptual and practical skills are interrelated aspects of a single capacity to have one's mind intentionally directed upon the world. The transparency of experience, on this view, is achieved in virtue of our capacities as agents as much as it is given in virtue of our capacities as perceivers.

show abstract

Towards an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of “Bodiliness” and “Grabbiness”

Ο’Regan

Myin

Noë

Seeing, Thinking and Knowing

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Looks as Powers

Cited by 77 publications

References 31 publications

Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience

Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience

Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism

Towards an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of “Bodiliness” and “Grabbiness”

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About