2019
DOI: 10.2140/apde.2019.12.1397
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Long time behavior of the master equation in mean field game theory

Abstract: Mean Field Game (MFG) systems describe equilibrium configurations in games with infinitely many interacting controllers. We are interested in the behavior of this system as the horizon becomes large, or as the discount factor tends to 0. We show that, in the two cases, the asymptotic behavior of the Mean Field Game system is strongly related with the long

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Cited by 54 publications
(62 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
(106 reference statements)
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“…Numerical methods are being developed, let us cite [1,5] for examples of this growing literature. Let us also mention the questions of long time average [9,8] or learning [6]. In some very particular cases (the so-called "potential case") solutions of the MFG system can be obtain from a PDE optimal control problem [2].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Numerical methods are being developed, let us cite [1,5] for examples of this growing literature. Let us also mention the questions of long time average [9,8] or learning [6]. In some very particular cases (the so-called "potential case") solutions of the MFG system can be obtain from a PDE optimal control problem [2].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover we insist that in the presence of a common noise, the reduction of the MFG to the system (1) collapses and the study of the master equation is crucial for the understanding of the MFG. We refer the reader to [10,25] for a detailed study of the master equation and to [8,19] for examples of applications.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Proof. The proof follows closely the one proposed in [12] and it relies on semiconcavity estimates for the value function u. We recall that if φ ∈ C ∞ (T d ) then…”
Section: Existence Of a Correctormentioning
confidence: 70%
“…Let us first recall that, in the open-loop regime, limits of Nash equilibria in the N´player game are MFG equilibria [1,17,24]. On the other hand, in the closed loop Markovian regime, the convergence problem is surprisingly open up to now, although the existence of a solution to the ergodic master equation is known [8]: Indeed in this ergodic set-up, the use of the solution to the master equation is not obvious and the technique of proof of [6] does not seem to apply. Here we concentrate on the limit of equilibria in N´player differential games with generalized Markov strategies.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%