Long run price inflexibility and efficiency loss for municipal water supply

A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire

“…29 Columns 3 to 5 of Table 5 report the relative welfare changes associated with the switch from the existing tariff to Tariffs 2, 3 and 4 respectively, for each of the 10 regions, and the entire country. They are in the same range as those obtained in Garcia and Reynaud (2004) but contrast with those of Swallow and Martin (1988) and Renzetti (1992). 30 For the country as a whole (last row of Table 5), the change in social welfare from switching to a proposed tariff is positive; however, there are significant differences across regions.…”

Measuring the Dynamic Efficiency Costs of Regulators' Preferences: Municipal Water Utilities in the Arid West

“…This paper empirically identifies the objective function of municipal managers that underlines these price-discounting decisions, measures the deadweight losses resulting from those decisions, and recovers the efficient pricing policy function from counterfactual experiments. Unlike previous studies (Renzetti (1992), Swallow and Marin (1988), Feldman, Breese, and Obeiter (1981)) it does so in an empirical context that acknowledges the important intertemporal consequences of the pricing decisions made by the managers of groundwater dependent municipalities.…”

Volumetric water pricing, social surplus and supply augmentation

“…Methods have been developed to calculate the marginal costs associated with incremental increases to capacity [33], but these approaches assume no uncertainty in future supplies or homogeneous and infinite supplies of unprocessed water [28]. If marginal cost is calculated on the basis of augmented capacity, however, then when this increased capacity is triggered, which depends on optimal volumetric pricing and uncertain future inflows to water catchments and storages, determines the actual cost.…”