Long‐range subjective‐probability forecasts of slow‐motion variables in world politics: Exploring limits on expert judgment

Abstract

Skeptics see long‐range geopolitical forecasting as quixotic. A more nuanced view is that although predictability tends to decline over time, its rate of descent is variable. The current study gives geopolitical forecasters a sporting chance by focusing on slow‐motion variables with low base rates of change. Analyses of 5, 10, and 25‐year cumulative‐risk judgments made in 1988 and 1997 revealed: (a) specialists beat generalists at predicting nuclear proliferation but not shifting nation‐state boundaries; (b) some counterfactual interventions—for example, Iran gets the bomb before 2022—boosted experts’ edge but others—for example, nuclear war before 2022—eliminated it; (c) accuracy fell faster on topics where expertise conferred no edge in shorter‐range forecasts. To accelerate scientific progress, we propose adversarial collaborations in which clashing schools of thought negotiate Bayesian reputational bets on divisive issues and use Lakatosian scorecards to incentivize the honoring of bets.

Exploring the limits on Meliorism: A commentary on Tetlock et al. (2023)

“…The target article for this symposium, Tetlock et al (2023), undercuts two oft-heard generalizations about geopolitical forecasting: namely, that specialists in world politics are hard-pressed to beat wellinformed generalists (Mellers et al, 2015;Tetlock, 2017)-and that accuracy falls off the further into the future either specialists or generalists try to see (Satopää et al, 2021;Tetlock, 2017). The surprise finding was the superior performance of experts on nuclear proliferation in separating cases of proliferation and non-proliferation as far out as 25 years.…”