Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities

Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

“…4 See for example Piketty (1994). 5 Our results hold under complete information, when each voter's direction and intensity of preferences are publicly known. But they also hold if intensities of preferences are private information, and in this case they hold under different scenarios: when each voter's individual membership in the majority or minority is publicly known; when the sizes of the two groups are known, but other voters' individual membership is not, and they hold when voters know their own minority or majority status, but cannot estimate precisely the size of the two groups.…”

“…Indeed, our results hold identically under different informational assumptions, and under both complete and incomplete information, as long as voters know their own majority or minority status. 5 Second, the concept of ex ante competitive equilibrium generalizes to an asymmetric setting: the contribution in CLP is not limited to a knife-edge case. We construct an ex ante equilibrium that extends in intuitive fashion the equilibrium characterized by CLP.…”

A regra da maioria como agregação de preferências: questões e respostas

“…Carruba e Volden (2000) afirmam que o logrolling é facilitado quando existem poucos políticos, os projetos trazem mais benefícios que custos, o futuro tem grande valor, a chance de reeleição é alta, a coalizão é fácil de ser formada e as regras de votação são menos inclusivas. Segundo Bernholz (1973), a situação de logrolling só é possível se as preferências sociais forem intransitivas. Stratmann (1997) explica que os custos de uma preferência aprovada devem, em muitos casos, ser pagos por todos, e não apenas pelos seus beneficiários, gerando nestes últimos a sensação de que a escolha saiu barato.…”

American foreign policy : the utility of force as an influence, bargaining, or coercive force in the Caribbean Basin

“…Moralists recognize that states and their rulers do not behave according to moral standards, but they believe "they ought to do so" and that it is the duty of leaders to create an international environment in which they will achieve this aim. 8 The moralist position can be further refined by differentiating between a moral, or ethical perfectionist, and a non-perfectionist moralist.…”

“…• 24 8 The term strategy also implies that a state's military policies represent "calculated, coherent plans" designed "to influence the course of international developments in a desired manner.…”