Logic State Imaging From FA Techniques for Special Applications to One of the Most Powerful Hardware Security Side-Channel Threats

Boit, Christian; Kiyan, Tüba; Krachenfels, Thilo; Seifert, Jean-Pierre

doi:10.1109/ipfa49335.2020.9261000

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Our attack approach has already been sketched in [43] and assumes that the adversary has access to a training device, for which she can control the contained secret at her will. However, she does not have any knowledge about the design of the chip and the location of the key storage.…”

Section: Attack Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automatic Extraction of Secrets from the Transistor Jungle using Laser-Assisted Side-Channel Attacks

Krachenfels,

Kiyan,

Tajik

et al. 2021

Preprint

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The security of modern electronic devices relies on secret keys stored on secure hardware modules as the root-of-trust (RoT). Extracting those keys would break the security of the entire system. As shown before, sophisticated side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, using chip failure analysis (FA) techniques, can extract data from on-chip memory cells. However, since the chip's layout is unknown to the adversary in practice, secret key localization and reverse engineering are onerous tasks. Consequently, hardware vendors commonly believe that the ever-growing physical complexity of the integrated circuit (IC) designs can be a natural barrier against potential adversaries. In this work, we present a novel approach that can extract the secret key without any knowledge of the IC's layout, and independent from the employed memory technology as key storage. We automate the -traditionally very laborintensive -reverse engineering and data extraction process.To that end, we demonstrate that black-box measurements captured using laser-assisted SCA techniques from a training device with known key can be used to profile the device for a later key prediction on other victim devices with unknown keys. To showcase the potential of our approach, we target keys on three different hardware platforms, which are utilized as RoT in different products.

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Section: Attack Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automatic Extraction of Secrets from the Transistor Jungle using Laser-Assisted Side-Channel Attacks

Krachenfels,

Kiyan,

Tajik

et al. 2021

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…Recently, EOFM has also been treated as a new class of physical attack that is fast becoming a key instrument in the hardware security community [5,6]. Without making any physical contact with ICs, an adversary can probe volatile and on-die-only secret data from the backside of a chip just with the help of an EOFM technique [7][8][9][10]. However, the physical mechanisms of EOFM signals from modern ICs have not been understood completely to date.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preliminary Study on Detecting the Internal Voltage Values of Integrated Circuits Based on Electro-Optical Frequency Mapping

Liu

Han

2022

Applied Sciences

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Electro-optical frequency mapping (EOFM) technology can detect node signals from the backside of integrated circuits (ICs). In the past, the detected signal only qualitatively represented the electrical activity strength inside the device. In this paper, the electro-optical signal generation mechanism of the device is systematically studied, and a concise physical model of laser beam modulation based on the optical transmission matrix is proposed. Firstly, the influence of the bandwidth of the laser and each structure covered by the laser spot on the electro-optical signal of the device is well described by the model. Secondly, the model quantifies the electro-optical signal strength, and shows it is positively correlated with the laser wavelength and the reverse bias voltage. Finally, the model is used to quantitatively calculate the accurate voltage level of the internal node inside the device using the detected signal, and the calculation results match well with the experimental results. The model provides theoretical guidance for the efficient and accurate extraction of internal voltage values of devices by EOFM technology.

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“…However, they remain jeopardized by the evolution of front-side and back-side invasive and semiinvasive attacks [1], [2], [3], [4]. Many physical inspection methods such as focused ion beam (FIB) micro-probing, FIB circuit editing, and contact-less optical probing, for failure analysis and defect localization [5], [6] have been utilized to identify regions of interests and/or extract sensitive information. SEM-based imaging, in combination with iterative integrated circuit (IC) deprocessing, can be used to recover the layout and eventually the gate-level netlist of a semiconductor IP [7], [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proof of Reverse Engineering Barrier: SEM Image Analysis on Covert Gates

Farheen

Botero

Varshney

et al. 2021

International Symposium for Testing and Failure Analysis

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IC camouflaging has been proposed as a promising countermeasure against malicious reverse engineering. Camouflaged gates contain multiple functional device structures, but appear as one single layout under microscope imaging, thereby hiding the real circuit functionality from adversaries. The recent covert gate camouflaging design comes with a significantly reduced overhead cost, allowing numerous camouflaged gates in circuits and thus being resilient against various invasive and semi-invasive attacks. Dummy inputs are used in the design, but SEM imaging analysis was only performed on simplified dummy contact structures in prior work. Whether the e-beam during SEM imaging will charge differently on different contacts and further reveal the different structures or not requires extended research. In this study, we fabricated real and dummy contacts in various structures and performed a systematic SEM imaging analysis to investigate the possible charging and the consequent passive voltage contrast on contacts. In addition, machine-learning based pattern recognition was also employed to examine the possibility of differentiating real and dummy contacts. Based on our experimental results, we found that the difference between real and dummy contacts is insignificant in SEM imaging, which effectively prevents adversarial SEM-based reverse engineering. Index Terms—Reverse Engineering, IC Camouflaging, Scanning Electron Microscopy, Machine Learning, Countermeasure.

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Logic State Imaging From FA Techniques for Special Applications to One of the Most Powerful Hardware Security Side-Channel Threats

Cited by 7 publications

References 13 publications

Automatic Extraction of Secrets from the Transistor Jungle using Laser-Assisted Side-Channel Attacks

Automatic Extraction of Secrets from the Transistor Jungle using Laser-Assisted Side-Channel Attacks

Preliminary Study on Detecting the Internal Voltage Values of Integrated Circuits Based on Electro-Optical Frequency Mapping

Proof of Reverse Engineering Barrier: SEM Image Analysis on Covert Gates

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