Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff

Irwin, Douglas A.; Kroszner, Randall S.

doi:10.1016/s0167-2231(96)00023-1

Cited by 46 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Much of the historical tariff literature has focused on questions of political economy, most prominently in the U.S. case, by Frank Taussig (1931) and more recently in studies that focus on the Hawley-Smoot tariffs by Eichengreen (1989) and Irwin and Kroszner (1996): Why was such a bill passed at such a crucial time? Who benefited (ex ante) and who lost?…”

Section: A Brief Tariff Historymentioning

confidence: 99%

Tariffs and the Great Depression Revisited

Crucini

Kahn

2003

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractDrawing on recent business cycle research on the Great Depression, we return to an argument we advanced in a 1996 article in the Journal of Monetary Economics-the argument that features of the Hawley-Smoot tariffs could have done more to decrease economic activity than is customarily believed, though not enough to account for the severe decline of the early 1930s. Here we reformulate our argument in a business cycle accounting framework that apportions fluctuations between three types of "wedges": (productive) inefficiency, the consumption-leisure margin, and intertemporal inefficiency.Tariff increases in our model correspond primarily to productive inefficiency in a prototype one-sector model. Moreover, the wedge implied by tariffs during the Depression correlates well with the overall measure of productive inefficiency. Our model fails to produce a labor wedge of any consequence-persuasive evidence that factors other than tariffs also contributed significantly to the severity of the Depression.Crucini:

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Section: A Brief Tariff Historymentioning

confidence: 99%

Tariffs and the Great Depression Revisited

Crucini

Kahn

2003

SSRN Journal

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“…First, the average publicly traded firm is younger, not older, in 1935 than in 1995 (25 years versus 32 years), and the median ages are very close in the two periods (20 years versus 19 years). Both the 1920s and 1980s witnessed dramatic increases in the number of firms going public, thereby accounting for the skewness in the age distribution of firms in both periods (Kroszner (1996)). Second, in each of the age categories, measured at 10‐year intervals until 50 years of age and at 25‐year intervals from 50 until 100 years, the mean and median insider ownerships are higher in 1995 than 1935.…”

Section: Comparability Of Insider Ownership In 1935 and 1995: Chmentioning

confidence: 99%

Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression

Holderness

Kroszner

Sheehan

1999

The Journal of Finance

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421

129

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We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership has risen from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership.

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“…Imports as a share of GDP, for example, rose from 2.8% to 10.3% between 1935 and 1995. 21 Since product market competition was at least as intense in 1995 as in 1935, this factor cannot account for the increase in managerial ownership during the period.…”

Section: Why Has Managerial Stock Ownership Increased?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise in Managerial Stock Ownership

Holderness

Kroszner

Sheenan

2000

J Applied Corp Finance

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Despite the widespread view from Berle and Means onward that ownership of U.S. companies has become increasingly separated from managerial control, the authors report that managerial ownership of public corporations is markedly higher today than in 1935. Using a comprehensive sample of the 1,500 publicly traded firms in 1935 and a comparable sample of 4,200 firms in 1995, their study finds that managerial ownership increased from an average of 13% in 1935 to 21% in 1995. In terms of real (1995) dollar values, average managerial ownership increased from $18 million to $73 million over the same 60-year period. 2000 Morgan Stanley.

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Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff

Cited by 46 publications

References 10 publications

Tariffs and the Great Depression Revisited

Tariffs and the Great Depression Revisited

Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression

The Rise in Managerial Stock Ownership

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