LoET-E: A Refined Theory for Proving Security Properties of Cryptographic Protocols

Abstract

Nowadays, more and more new cryptographic protocols are emerging, and the security analysis of emerging cryptographic protocols is increasingly important. The logic of events is an axiomatic method based on theorem proving, designed around message automation with actions for possible protocol steps; it figured out types of information transmitted in the protocols and also presented novel proof rules and mechanism. However, with the emergence of various cryptographic protocols, the logic of events lacks corresponding axioms and rules in the process of proving certain cryptographic protocols, so it needs a further extension. Based on the logical framework of protocol composition logic, this paper presents a refined theory of the logic of events called LoET-E, in which the novel rules about the freshness of nonces, the event attributes of messages, and the states of the predicate is presented; the concepts of Fresh, Gen and FirstSend is introduced; and the definition of has and the honesty axiom of LoET is extended. The refined theory can guarantee the correctness, integrity, and validity of the original axioms, ensure the consistency of event classes and basic sequences in the proof process, reduce the complexity and redundancy in the protocol analysis process, and most importantly, extend the provable range of cryptographic protocols. INDEX TERMS Cryptographic protocols, logic of events, LoET-E, theorem proving, information security.

Formal Security Analysis of ECC-Based RFID in Logic of Events Theory

“…LoET is based on a message automaton design that defines possible protocol actions, and the analysis process abstracts the interaction actions between honest subjects into different types of events, defines the interaction of the protocol formally as a basic sequence using an event language, and proves the security properties of the protocol based on LoET axiomatic system reasoning. Logic of events theory and related rules are referred to in the literature [14][15][16][17][18][19], and the related theories involved in this paper are given below.…”

“…In 2009, Meihua Xiao, in collaboration with the proponents of the logic of events theory, addressed the shortcomings of PCL [15] (Protocol Composition Logic), and he applied LoET to analyse security protocols [16]. In recent years, Prof. Meihua Xiao has led a team to extend LoET to formally analyse the security of security protocols in several different domains [17][18][19]. However, the existing LoET also has limitations: for some authentication protocols with complex cryptographic schemes, the event logic theory cannot perform a formal analysis of them.…”